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CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS:
INTERPRETATION AND LEGITIMACY
IN CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL
THOUGHT°
By JOEL C. BAKAN*
The author provides an analysis and critique of the various types of arguments
advanced by Canadian constitutional jurists to establish formal grounds for the
legitimacy of judicial review under the Canadian constitution. He demonstrates how
two variables - constitutional truth and trust in the judiciary - are relied upon in
past and contemporary debates about constitutional adjudication to construct four
different types of argument about the legitimacy of judicial review. Each of these
types of argument is then criticized in the context of recent Charter decisions. It is
argued that none of them can sustain the burden of legitimating judicial review.
This paper will analyze and criticize the various types of
arguments advanced by Canadian constitutional jurists to establish
formal grounds for the legitimacy of judicial review under Canada's
constitution Judicial review requires judges to determine the legal
Copyright, 1989, Joel C. Bakan.
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to thank the following people for their help and support in the preparation of this paper.
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Hogg, Allan Hutchinson, Duncan Kennedy, Patrick Macklem, James MacPherson, Hans Mohr,
Andrew Petter, Hazel Pollack, lain Ramsay, Paula Rochman, Bruce Ryder.
I Arguments that attempt to establish formal grounds of legitimacy have two basic
characteristics. First, they seek to provide reasons, other than the threat of coercion, why
people should comply with the dictates of the institution on behalf of which the argument is
made. Second, the reasons are formal : they do not appeal to the substantive merits of
particular decisions but, rather, to formal principles prescribing the correct processes and
methods of decision-making. Arguments about the legitimacy of judicial review generally
relate to how judges should decide constitutional cases, not what they should decide. Thus,
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validity of actions by the political institutions - the legislature and
executive - of the state.2  The usual principles advanced in a
Parliamentary democracy to legitimate the exercise of political power
are not available for judicial review. They are, indeed, challenged
by the practice: judges, who are neither responsible to nor
representative of the electorate, scrutinize the power of institutions
that are thought to be both. Constitutional jurisprudence and
scholarship are concerned to a large degree with constructing
arguments aimed at mediating the apparent conflict between judicial
review and the principles of Parliamentary democracy.
Two structures of mediation are relied upon in Canadian
constitutional discourse. First, one finds the argument that judges
are constrained by the constitution to reach legally correct answers
to particular constitutional questions. They do not, therefore,
substitute their policy choices and preferences for those of elected
officials. Such arguments acknowledge that when judges make
decisions under the constitution, they exercise power - they use the
power of the court, and therefore the state, to condone or rearrange
existing social and legal relations - but they portray the exercise of
such power as legitimate because it is required by the constitution.
Legitimacy thus depends on the plausibility of a unique link between
legitimation arguments normally take the form of theories of interpretation. A theory of
interpretation is one which "attempt[s] to govern interpretations of particular texts by
appealing to an account of interpretation in general:" S. Knapp & W.B. Michaels "Against
Theory' in W.J.T. Mitchell, ed., Against Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985)
at 11. See also S. Fish, "Consequences" in Against Theory, ibid at 106-08.
For discussions of the concept of legitimation see: D. Hay, "Property, Authority and
the Criminal Law," in D. Hay et al. eds, Albion's Fatal Tree (London: Pantheon Books, 1975);
A. Hyde, "The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology of Law" (1983) Wisconsin L. Rev.
379; A. Przeworski, Capitalism and Social Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1987); . Habermas, Legitimation Crisis (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973); M. Kelman, A
Guide to Critical Legal Studies (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987) and W. Connolly,
Legitimacy and the State (New York: New York University Press, 1984). For a discussion of
the substantive 'visions" associated with formal legal arguments, see: D. Kennedy, "Form and
Substance in Private Law Adjudication" (1976) 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1685.
2 The judiciary is, of course, a political institution of the state as well. The problem of
legitimacy in the context of judicial review of judicial power does not, however, raise the
"counter-majoritarian" difficulties encountered when attempting to legitimate judicial review
of elected bodies. In any event, the problem of judicial review of judicial power is moot since
the Supreme Court of Canada's decision that the judiciary is not a branch of government and
is, therefore, not subject to the Charter see Dolphin Delivery v. RWID.S.U. (1986), 33 D.L.R.
(4th) 174 (S.C.C.).
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the constitutional prescription in question and the result rendered by
the Court in its name. The difficulty with this type of argument is
that most of the provisions of the constitutional text are couched in
language so general as to allow for multiple plausible meanings. A
definition of a concept like "liberty," "equality," "freedom of
expression," or "property and civil rights" may attract unanimous
assent when articulated at a high level of abstraction, but this
unanimity quickly fractures as the concept is defined in more and
more particular terms. While in theory judges must be constrained
by the concepts prescribed by the constitution in reaching their
decisions, constraint is problematic in practice because of the
indeterminacy of constitutional language. Those who rely on
constraint-based constitutional arguments address this problem by
constructing interpretive methodologies to resolve the ambiguities of
constitutional prescriptions and thus determine their true meanings.
The second type of argument relied upon to mediate the
apparent conflict between judicial review and democratic principles
contrasts sharply with the first. According to this argument, judicial
review necessarily involves the judiciary in discretionary decision-
making. The empirical premise of the first argument - that judges
can be constrained by the constitution to reach particular decisions
- is rejected. The constitution is understood as providing only vague
and general standards which may structure the adjudicative process
but cannot determine unique and uncontroversial solutions to
constitutional disputes. Thus, constitutional decisions are based on
judicial choice and discretion. Judges, like other policy-makers, must
balance competing interests and consider the probable consequences
of deciding one way or the other. Judicial review is considered
legitimate within this understanding of the practice on the ground
that judges can be trusted, because of their personal qualities and
institutional role, to balance competing interests impartially and
reasonably. The notion of trust as a basis for legitimacy is manifest
in modes of judicial reasoning that emphasize judicial discretion and
choice exercised in accordance with vague and indeterminate
standards in other areas of law. Equitable jurisdictions and doctrines
like unconscionability are examples in private law. In such areas, as
in constitutional law, the alleged professionalism, impartiality, moral
acumen, and general sense of fairness and decency of those who
hold judicial office are implicitly or explicitly relied upon as grounds
1989]
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for the legitimacy of judicial results. Judges are understood as
experts in the art of interest balancing. This approach rejects
abstract and general reasoning, deduction from allegedly determinate
norms, conceptualization, adherence to precedent, and the other
trappings of the style of legal reasoning premised on the need to
constrain judicial choice and discretion. These are understood by
advocates of the trust approach as impediments to, not requirements
of, rational and honest legal reasoning.
The following discussion will demonstrate how the two types
of legitimation argument - the one based on constraint by the
constitution, the other on trust in judicial interest balancing -
structure constitutional argument in Canadian legal discourse. In
Part I, I will examine the development of these two types of
argument by pre-Charter constitutional scholars in reaction to the
narrow and technical interpretive style of the Judicial Committee of
the Privy Council in Canadian constitutional cases. This will set the
stage for the following parts. In these, I will concentrate primarily
on attempts to legitimate judicial review under the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms. Part II will examine and criticize the
predominant style of constraint-based reasoning developed and
applied by the Supreme Court of Canada in Charter adjudication,
namely, purposive interpretation and a legalistic section 1 analysis.
My critique will emphasize that this style of reasoning does not meet
the criterion of legitimacy that underlies it. It does not make
determinate the indeterminate provisions of the constitutional text,
and cannot therefore be relied upon to support the view that
constitutional decisions are the products of constitutional constraints.
Part III will analyze trust-based arguments in the Supreme Court's
Charter adjudication. Here I will suggest there are insufficient
grounds for trusting judicial value choices and discretion and
accordingly that trust is not a plausible formal ground for legitimacy.
In Part IV, I will examine critically the argument often understood
as following from the insufficiency of constraint and trust as formal
grounds of legitimacy, namely, that the only legitimate response of
the Court in constitutional cases is judicial restraint. Finally, Part V
will look at the argument, made by many contemporary constitutional
scholars, that constitutional decision-making is constrained and
objective even though there are not always constitutionally
determined answers to constitutional questions. This argument
[VOL. 27 NO. I
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attempts to establish and defend a middle ground between the
constraint-based view that a constitutionally correct answer exists for
every constitutional question, and the trust-based view that
constitutional interpretation is inevitably discretionary and result
oriented. I will argue that the middle ground only compounds the
difficulties concerning legitimacy encountered in the other
approaches.
I.
The legitimacy of judicial review under the Constitution has
been a problem in Canadian legal thought for more than a century.
Soon after the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council handed down
its first decisions under the British Nor-th America Act, 1867, a rather
heated debate developed in Canadian law journals on the propriety
of relying on an elite group of British judges to shape the Canadian
constitution. The debate was focused more closely on the legitimacy
of the Privy Council than on the legitimacy of judicial review per se.
Nonetheless, it was the beginning of a critical voice in Canadian
constitutional thought and provides a useful background for
understanding later developments.
Critics of the Judicial Committee in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth century had a number of complaints.3 First, they
argued that the reasoning of the Judicial Committee, particularly in
its constitutional opinions, was confusing and conflictual.4 Second,
they pointed out that having a "foreign" tribunal as the highest court
of appeal for Canadian cases was an affront to the dignity of Canada
and Canadians.5 Third and fourth, the Judicial Committee was
3 See generally A. Galt, "Appeals to the Privy Council" (1921) 41 Can. L.T. 168; A.
Cairns, 'The Judicial Committee and Its Critics" (1971) 4 Can. J. Pol. Sci. 301; and J. Snell
& F. Vaughan, The Supreme Court of Canada (Toronto: The Osgoode Society, 1985) at 189-
91.
4 Editorial, 'Mhe Privy Council Decisions" (1894) 14 Can. L.T. 323 and Editorial, 'The
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council" (1894) 14 Can. L.T. 164.
5 W.S. Deacon, "Canadians and The Privy Council" (1911) 31 Can. L.T. 6 and 123.
1989]
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thought to be biased in favour of corporations6 and provincial
powers7 respectively. Fifth, appeals to the Judicial Committee were
considered to be "in the interest of the moneyed classes and inimical
to the masses" because "outside of corporations and rich people"
nobody could afford to cross the Atlantic with their appeals. Sixth,
members of the Judicial Committee were thought to be ignorant of
political, social and economic conditions in Canada.9
Defenders of the Judicial Committee emphasized the
weaknesses of the Supreme Court of Canada, and insisted that "the
assertion that there is any inconsistency to be found in the decisions
of [the Judicial Committee] is without any warrant whatsoever."10
The fact that the Judicial Committee was not in Canada was
understood as an advantage. "Being far removed from the cause of
litigation, their judgements are not affected or tainted with local
spirit or prejudice."1" Finally, in contrast to the nationalism of the
critics, the defenders of the Judicial Committee argued for the
importance of continuing appeals so as to maintain links with the
United Kingdom. One commentator characterized the critics of the
Judicial Committee as "furiosant fanatics, ... dissensionists and
disintegrators, [who] abhor the notion that Canada is dependent for
anything on the United Kingdom, even the right interpretation of its
Constitution and Laws."12
6 Ibid. For a review of newspaper editorials in the early twentieth century supporting the
position that the Judicial Committee was pro-business, see: Editorial, "Shall We Stop
Appealing to the Privy Council" (1912) 32 Can. L.T. 804.
7 This theme became quite pronounced during the 1930's as we shall see below. For an
early example of this type of critique, see G. Rae, "Some Constitutional Opinions of the Late
Mr. Justice Gwynne" (1904) 24 Can. L.T. 1, at 12-15. See, also, A. Cairns, supra, note 3.
8 W.S. Deacon, supra, note 5, at 128.
9 T. Hodgins, 'qhe Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and Colonial Judges" (1895)
15 Can. L.T. 133.
10 Editorial, "The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council" (1894) 30 Can. LJ. 294 at
296.
11 W. Nesbitt, 'qhe Judicial Committee of the Privy Council" (1909) 29 Can. L.T. 241
at 249; J. Small "Supreme Court and Privy Council Appeals" 29 Can. LT. 47; Editorial, (1891)
27 Can. LJ. 33 and Editorial, "Our Court of Final Appeal" (1912) 48 Can. LJ. 205.
12 Editorial, "Privy Council Appeals" (1921) 41 Can. L.T. 161 at 162.
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Despite such petulant reactions, Canadian constitutional
jurists continued to criticize the work of the Judicial Committee
under the British North America Act, 1867. In giving effect to the
provisions of that Act, the Judicial Committee had frustrated many
of the legislative programs of the federal government, and by the
middle of the 1930s charges of provincial bias and anti-regulatory
sentiment were regularly levelled by eminent Canadian jurists. These
jurists alleged the Judicial Committee was importing to Canada its
own distorted image of the Canadian constitution and doing so
behind a facade of narrow and technical interpretation. The
legitimacy of its decisions striking down various legislative initiatives
was no longer taken for granted. Legitimacy became a problem
rather than a premise, and critical analyses of the Judicial
Committee's interpretive methods occupied the leading constitutional
jurists of the day.1 3
Throughout its tenure as the final court of appeal for
Canadian constitutional cases,1 4 the Judicial Committee approached
constitutional adjudication as a technical and legalistic exercise,
reasoning in its decisions as though the broad concepts elaborated
in the text of the B.NA. Act, 1867 could determine particular
meanings and results through deductive analysis of the constitutional
text and doctrine. While the Judicial Committee acknowledged that
ambiguous phrases required resort to various techniques and rules
of statutory construction as well as consideration of the textual
context in which the phrases were situated, it assumed determinate
meaning could always be found within the four corners of the text.
The B.N.A. Act was to be treated "by the same methods of
construction and exposition which [courts] apply to other statutes.
'ZS
"[I]f the text is explicit the text is conclusive.... [W]hen the text is
13 See Cairns, supra, note 3.
14 Appeals to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in constitutional cases were
abolished in 1949.
15 Lambe's Case (1887), 12 App. Cas. 575 (P.C.) at 579. See V. MacDonald, 'The
Constitution in a Changing World" (1948) 26 Can. Bar Rev. 21 at 31; W.H.P. Clement, The
Law of the Canadian Constitution, 3d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1916) at 472-92; A.H.F. Lefroy,
The Law of Legislative Power in Canada (Toronto: Toronto Law Book and Publishing
Company, 1897) at 21-40 and W.P.M. Kennedy, Some Aspects of the Theories and Workings
of Constitutional Law (New York. MacMillan, 1932) at 71-95.
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ambiguous ... recourse must be had to the context and scheme of the
Act.116  Underlying this approach to interpretation was the
presumption that the judges of the Judicial Committee were
constrained by the text of the B.N.A. Act, 1867, and therefore
required by the Act to reach the results they did. At least in theory
then, the intervention of judicial choice and discretion was avoided.17
The Judicial Committee's interpretive methodology attracted
two types of criticism. Alan Cairns has characterized these as
"fundamentalist" and "constitutionalist. '18  The fundamentalists
believed the original intention of the constitutional framers was to
establish a centralized federal system. This intent was, according to
the fundamentalists, embodied in the B.N.A. Act and evident in the
materials surrounding its inception. The fault of the Judicial
Committee was its radical deviation from the purposes and intentions
of the constitutional framers. Constitutionalists, on the other hand,
"asserted that the Judicial Committee should have been an agent for
constitutional flexibility, concerned with the policy consequences of
their decisions."19  Accordingly they called for liberal and flexible
interpretation, open acknowledgement of the policy role of judges,
and consideration of social and economic facts in constitutional
adjudication. The two modes of critique identified by Cairns
correspond to the two types of legitimation argument elaborated
earlier. The fundamentalist critique attacked the legitimacy of the
16A.-G. Ontario v.A.-G. Canada (1911), [1912] AC. 571 (P.C.) at 583. See MacDonald,
ibid.; Clement, ibid.; Le Froy, ibid; Kennedy, ibid.
17 See, for a classic example of this type of reasoning, Citizens Insurance Company of
Canada v. Parsons (1881), 7 App. Cas. 96. The question was whether insurance contracts
fell within the provincial power to regulate "property and civil rights in the province," or the
federal power to regulate "trade and commerce." The complainant had alleged that a
provincial Act regulating insurance was invalid. The Judicial Committee disagreed. First, it
argued that, on a proper construction of the words "property and civil rights," there was "no
reason for presuming that contracts and the rights arising from them were not intended to
be included in this provision." Ibid. at 110-11. Second, the Judicial Committee argued, the
words "trade and commerce" could not be construed to include insurance contracts. While
the words themselves were "sufficiently wide ... to include every regulation of trade," their
meaning was "[controlled] by [their] context and other parts of the Act," and "[they did] not
comprehend the power to regulate by legislation the contracts of a particular business or
trade, such as the business of fire insurance in a single province...." Ibid. at 113.
18 Supra, note 3 at 302.
19 ibid. at 307.
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constitutional decisions of the Judicial Committee on the ground
they were based on interpretations that were contrary to the true
meaning of the constitution. According to this critique, the judges
of the Judicial Committee were substituting their views (and biases)
in place of the allegedly uncontroversial requirements of the
constitution. Implied in the critique was an understanding of the
legitimacy of judicial outcomes that required they be detennined by
constitutional norms. Judges were not to function as policy-makers,
but rather as humble servants of constitutional law and the purposes
and intentions underlying it. The constitutionalist critique rested
upon a very different assumption about legitimacy, one that
emphasized trust in judicial policy-making rather than constraint by
constitutional "truths." The judge was understood and trusted as an
enlightened policy-maker, whose job was to keep the constitution
current with the changing times through careful consideration of the
social and economic consequences of decisions. The judge's role was
not to posture as a mechanical administrator of allegedly determinate
constitutional norms.
The two types of critique, with their different assumptions
about the legitimacy of judicial review, are manifest in the critical
constitutional scholarship of the 1930s. They are well illustrated in
a collection of articles, written by three of Canada's most respected
constitutional scholars - Vincent MacDonald, W.P.M. Kennedy, and
F.R. Scott2° - in response to the Judicial Committee's decisions of
1937 striking down the Federal government's "New Deal" legislative
program.2 1 In each of these articles the respective author developed
both "fundamentalist" and "constitutionalist" types of arguments to
criticize the decisions of the Judicial Committee.
20 V. MacDonald, 'The Canadian Constitution Seventy Years After" (1937) 15 Can. Bar
Rev. 401; W.P.M. Kennedy, 'The British North America Act: Past and Future" (1937) 15 Can.
Bar Rev. 393; and F.R. Scott, 'The Consequences of the Privy Council Decisions" (1937) 15
Can. Bar Rev. 485.
21 Supra, note 3 at 325-27. The "New Deal" cases are Reference Re Weekly Rest in
Industrial Undertakings Ac Mininum Wages Act and Limitation of Hours of Work Act, [1937]
1 D.LR. 673 (P.C.); Reference Re Employment and Social Insurance Act, [19371 1 D.L.R. 684
(P.C.); Reference Re Natural Products Marketing Act, [1937] 1 D.L.R. 691 (P.C.); Reference Re
Farmers' Creditors Arrangement Act 1934, [1937] 1 D.L.R. 695 (P.C.) and Reference Re
Dominion Trade and Industry Commission Act 1935, [1937] 1 D.L.R. 702 (P.C).
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The "fundamentalist" argument is evident in the critics'
insistence that in the "New Deal" cases the Judicial Committee had
misinterpreted the constitution, and substituted its own pro-provincial
predilections for the constraints of the constitution. F.R. Scott, for
example, noted that the pro-provincial bias of the Privy Council
undoubtedly "had the effect of giving us a constitution exactly the
opposite, in one vital respect, of that which we actually adopted in
1867.22 In his view, the decisions of the Privy Council in the New
Deal cases were nothing short of a "constitutional revolution ... a
striking example of judicial legislation."23 Similarly, Kennedy argued
that the decisions had frustrated the centralist intentions of the
founders of Canada,24  and MacDonald was sure the decisions
depicted "a constitution of a character the complete reverse of that
intended; for the result is a decentralized federalism with the
effective residue of legislative power in the province."25  Implicit in
the arguments advanced by each author was the view that the
legitimacy of the outcomes in the "New Deal" decisions was seriously
compromised by the Judicial Committee's unwillingness to be
constrained by the true purposes of the Constitution - namely, strong
centralism. 26
22 F.R. Scott, supra, note 20 at 488.
23 ibid. at 488-89.
24 W.P.M. Kennedy, supra, note 20 at 400.
25 V. Macdonald, supra, note 20 at 424.
26 The tenor of the critique is captured by E. McWhinney in the following comments:
My criticisms have been directed specifically to the failure of the Privy Council
frankly to acknowledge and admit, in its formal opinions accompanying its decisions,
that it was engaging in constitutional elaborations that were neither expressly
warranted by the text of the Constitution, nor supported by the original historical
intentions of the Founding Fathers of the Constitution, in reaching the results that
the Privy Council did, in the period from 1896 onwards, in relation to social and
economic planning legislation and Dominion-Provincial relations generally. The
judicial policy-maker surely has certain obligations of public candour, in order to
expose the judicial policy choices to the democratic corrective of public discussion
and criticism! The failure of the Privy Council, in relation to the Canadian
Constitution, to be frank and explicit as to the policy bases of its opinions, meant
that the reasons for the actual policy choices too often remained obscured and
concealed, with the policy considerations necessarily operating then as "inarticulate
major premises" to the final decision.
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A very different concern about the legitimacy of the "New
Deal" decisions is implicit in the "constitutionalist" strand in the
articles by Scott, Kennedy, and MacDonald. From the
constitutionalist perspective, the failure of the Judicial Committee
was its adherence to narrow and technical reasoning and its
unwillingness to consider openly the probable policy consequences
of deciding constitutional disputes one way or the other. W.P.M.
Kennedy, for example, complained that by interpreting the
constitution "precisely as framed," the Judicial Committee had failed
to consider important "questions of expediency or of political
exigency."27  Similarly, Vincent MacDonald adopted S.E. Smith's
observation that the Judicial Committee's decisions did not display
"any burning anxiety to make ... [the] constitution ... fit contemporary
needs."28 According to him, while "purely legal interpretation" might
have been fitting in other areas of law, in constitutional law
"interpretation [turned] on consideration of policy ... to a large
degree,"29 and should not seek to avoid policy considerations.
Having acknowledged the need for more open policy-making
in constitutional adjudication, however, the critics had to once again
emphasize the deficiencies of the Judicial Committee's constitutional
jurisdiction. There was little reason to trust a body located across
the Atlantic and staffed by British Law Lords to make important
policy decisions for Canada. While all of the critics believed the
constitution should be kept flexible, able to adapt to a growing and
changing society, this only strengthened their resolve that
constitutional appeals to the Judicial Committee should be abolished.
They argued that the Judicial Committee was not in touch with
contemporary Canadian needs and concerns and could not rationally
make the important policy decisions required in constitutional
adjudication even if it were willing to abandon its legalistic
interpretive style. The Judicial Committee was, therefore,
Judicial Review in the English Speaking World, 3d ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1965) at 223-24.
27 W.P.M. Kennedy, supra, note 20 at 393.
28 Ibid. at 425, note 46.
29 Ibid. at 426.
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considered by its critics to be an inappropriate body for deciding
Canadian constitutional cases.
The themes of constraint and trust continued to inform the
work of critical constitutional scholars through the 1940s and 1950s.
Like Scott, MacDonald, and Kennedy, the scholars of this era
believed constitutional law was different than other types of law
because of its close connection to the most important political, social
and economic issues of the day. As well, they embraced the view
that narrow and legalistic interpretation in constitutional adjudication
functioned to mask judicial bias. The three scholars of this era upon
whom I will focus - Laskin, Friedmann, and LaBrie - did not agree
among themselves on the appropriate solution to the problem they
identified. Friedmann and LaBrie believed constraint of judicial
choice and discretion was essential for the legitimacy of judicial
review. According to them, while the constitutional text and
doctrine could not alone provide such constraint, the purposes and
principles underlying the constitution could and should have been
relied upon to constrain judicial decision-making. Laskin, on the
other hand, appears to have believed that constraint on judicial
choice and discretion was neither possible nor desirable and rested
his case for legitimacy on trust in judicial sensibility.
Before looking at their differences, I would like to examine
the view that all three scholars shared, namely, that constitutional
adjudication was political in spite of the facade of legalism
constructed by the Judicial Committee. Laskin argued that the text
of the B.N.A. Act and doctrine developed under it could not
constrain judicial choice and discretion in constitutional cases.
Constitutional adjudication inevitably required choice "according to
social and economic preferences" and such choice was merely
"concealed in constitutional interpretation," rather than avoided by
it.30  For example, an examination of the cases relating to the
"peace, order and good government clause," did not, for Laskin,
"indicate any inevitability in the making of particular decisions; if
anything, it indicate[d] conscious and deliberate choice of a policy
which required, for its advancement, manipulations which [could]
30 B. Laskin, 'Tests for the Validity of Legislation: What's the 'Matter'?" (1955) 11
U.T.L.J. 114 at 126.
134 [VOL. 27 NO. 1
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only with difficulty be represented as ordinary judicial techniques. 31
According to Laskin:
The time has surely come in the history of our constitutional law to recognize the
conscious role that courts and judges have played in shaping federal and provincial
power and thereby controlling governmental policies.... We may as well deny the
existence of the court as to deny that judicial decisions are the products of social
and economic and political considerations for which the words of the British North
America Act are merely the vehicles of communication. The constitution is as open
as the minds of those called upon to interpret it; it is as closed as their minds are
closed.
3 2
On the basis of text and doctrine alone, most constitutional cases
"could just as well have been decided the other way."33
Friedmann noted that there were "two opposing view
points"34 of adjudication. The first was "the more widely accepted
by bench and bar in Canada ''3s and required the judge "to ignore
political and social issues"36 and to decide disputes on "technical legal
grounds."37 On this view, all statutes were to be "interpreted strictly,
according to rules laid down in text books and precedents on
statutory interpretation."38 This first view describes, as we have seen,
the dominant approach to constitutional interpretation of the Judicial
Committee. The opposing view, which Friedmann endorsed "though
31 B. Laskin, "Peace, Order and Good Government Re-Examined" (1947) 25 Can. Bar.
Rev. 1054 at 1086. In making this claim Laskin was attempting to refute the view that the
results reached by the Privy Council was the consequence of its choice to interpret the
constitution as a statute rather than a constitution. His point was that the policy choice was
first made, and it was then followed by attempts at justification through invocation of statutory
techniques. He had read the critics of the 1930's as seeing it the other way around. The
critics of the 1930's were not always clear on this point, though I believe the view expressed
by Laskin that politics preceded reasoning was implied in their critiques. See, also,
McWhinney, supra, note 26 at 68-69.
32 Supra, note 30 at 127.
33 Ibid. at 124.
34 W. Friedmann, "Judges, Politics and the Law" (1951) 29 Can. Bar Rev. 811 at 812.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 ibid.
38 Ibid.
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not without some reservations,"39 rejected as a "delusion" the first
view's "unpolitical treatment of predominately political and social
issues clothed in legal form." According to Friedmann, the first view
''usually [meant] the application of a thinly masked political
philosophy of the court, opposed to that of the legislator."40  The
B.NA. Act was, in his view, an "eminently political and general" 41
statute, a "document of a political [and] social character."42  Its
interpretation was a political activity, "as political as that of the
American Constitution by the Supreme Court of the United States,
and as far reaching in its social consequences."43
LaBrie, like Friedmann, noted there were "two points of
view" about constitutional interpretation: "According to the first
view, constitutional interpretation is a strictly judicial process
exercisable within fixed rules of law. According to the other,
constitutional interpretation exists as a legislative process, exercisable
on a discretionary basis..... 44  LaBrie believed the latter of these
views accurately described the constitutional work of the Judicial
Committee and Supreme Court of Canada.45 After a detailed review
of Canadian constitutional decisions and doctrine on legislative
validity, he noted "the very wide degree of judicial discretion"46
39 Ibid. at 813.
40 Ibid. at 812. See also Willis, Correspondence (1951) 29 Can. Bar Rev. 572 at 580.
41 Ibid. at 827. Common law adjudication was also in the latter camp according to
Friedmann. In common law adjudication it was impossible to maintain a distinction "between
the making of the law - which is the legislator's field - and the application of the law, which
is the judge's field." Ibid. at 819.
42 Ibid. at 828.
43 Ibid. at 827-28.
44 La Brie, "Canadian Constitutional Interpretation and Legislative Review" (1949) 8
U.T.L.J. 298 at 298.
45 According to him, the latter view had "always remained officially undeclared and
undisclosed." It could, however, be "perceived through the unsatisfactory logic of the judicial
decisions, the indecisive nature of the established rules for constitutional interpretation and
the inadequacy of the guidance to legislative validity afforded by previous decisions when
new legislation in answer to the problems created by social change is challenged as
unconstitutional." Ibid.
4 6 Ibid. at 340.
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exercised "behind the facade of statutory interpretation. 47
According to him, "it is by no means certain that judges are not
affected in their choice of proper legislative aspect by the fact that
they may like or dislike legislation."48 Judicial choices and discretion
in constitutional cases were based on a judge's view of the "wisdom"
of the legislation - on its "social and economic consequences" -
about which "there may exist much differences of opinion."
49
As noted earlier, Friedmann and LaBrie reached significantly
different conclusions than Laskin on the appropriate response to the
fact that constitutional adjudication was "eminently political."
Friedmann and LaBrie, having rejected the possibility that
constitutional decision-making could be constrained through narrow
and legalistic interpretation, nonetheless believed constraint to be a
necessary condition of legitimacy. Neither author was sympathetic
to judicial policy-making. Indeed, Friedman praised the post-
Lochner Court in the United States for having "abandoned the
distortion of the democratic process which followed from the all too
successful attempt of its predecessors to sit in judgement over the
policies of the legislator."50 Both Friedmann and LaBrie turned to
"purposive reasoning" as a source of constraint on judicial choice and
discretion in constitutional cases. They believed that, while narrow
and legalistic reasoning was insufficient to constrain judicial
discretion and thus avoid judicial politics, a method of interpretation
that directed judges to the principles and purposes underlying the
constitution as sources of constraint was workable and desirable.
La Brie and Friedmann differed on the question of where
to find these principles and purposes. La Brie's position was closer
to the "fundamentalist" tendencies of the 1937 critiques. He relied
on the historical purposes of the B.N.A. Act and believed the judge
could and should be constrained by the principles "intended by the
Act of 1867,"'s1 and ascertainable through analysis of "Canadian,
47 Ibid. at 310.
48 Ibid. at 344.
49 Ibid.
50 Supra, note 34 at 831.
51 Supra, note 44 at 318.
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British or United States history prior to, and at the time of,
confederation."52 LaBrie, like the earlier critics of the New Deal
decisions, believed the Judicial Committee's understanding of the
B.N.A. Act belied the true purposes of the Act. It showed "little
appreciation of the statesmanship or vision entering into Canada's
confederation" and thwarted "any ideal or purpose in the Act of
1867 going beyond the institutions immediately dealt with."53 The
historically true purposes of the constitution were, according to
LaBrie:
... the founding of a united nation, the furtherance of a collective prosperity, the
protection of minority groups, the laying of a constitutional foundation for the
enjoyment of individual freedom and civil rights, the assurance of uniformity in the
welfare, order, or good government of the nation at large.54
The proper function of the court in constitutional cases was to seek
guidance in and vindicate these principles and policies, not to satisfy
its own political agenda behind the guise of textual and doctrinal
argument.
Friedmann relied on contemporary social consensus about
values rather than historical intentions as the appropriate source of
constraint in constitutional adjudication. He believed a middle
position could be achieved between the unrealistic view that
constitutional interpretation was "devoid of and remote from political
and social issues,"55 and the unacceptable view that it was partial,
subjective and based on "political prejudices." The key was to
understand the constitution as functioning to serve the fundamental
principles and values of Canadian society which, in turn, could be
relied on to constrain judicial choice and discretion. Such principles
could be found in the "consensus of public opinion" and "the general
trend in legislative policy"56 in contemporary western democracies.
They were principles that "would find acceptance by all major
52 Ibid. at 319. See, also, A. Cairns, "he Judicial Committee and Its Critics" (1971) 4
Can. J. Pol. Sci. 301 at 335.
53 Ibid. at 320.
54 Ibid.
55 Supra, note 34 at 831.
56 Ibid. at 821.
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political parties, and [were] embodied in the legislative practice of
all contemporary democracies."57  They were in this sense "neutral
principles."58 According to Friedmann, judicial choice and discretion
in constitutional cases could be constrained if judges engaged in
"impartial consideration" of these principles and "the many factors,
of history, logic and political values which [went] into a constitutional
document. 59
Laskin did not share Friedmann's and LaBrie's concern to
find new sources of constraint on judicial decision-making in the
alleged purposes, historical or contemporary, of the constitution. For
Laskin, the difficulty with the decisions of the Judicial Committee,
was not that they were the product of judicial policy-making, but
rather that they were the product of uninformed, hidden, and
irrational policy-making. Unlike Friedmann and LaBrie, Laskin was
not troubled by the political nature of constitutional adjudication.
What troubled him about the Judicial Committee was its decidedly
apolitical approach to constitutional adjudication: the Judicial
Committee insisted on using narrow and legalistic techniques of
interpretation when what was really needed was rational and realistic
decision making informed by, and openly taking account of, social
Ibid. at 822. Friedmann was, however, aware that determining what the social
consensus required was not easy:
... it is not an easy task for a court to fix the borderline between accepted evolutions
in public opinion on the one hand, and personal philosophy or prejudice, on the
other. The great judges of our time have always been conscious of this difficulty.
Indeed it is their greatness that they have faced it, made it articulate, and gone
some way to solve it in their own judicial practice.
Ibid. at 821. Nonetheless, he appeared quite confident in his ability to do it:
In the last generation, a decisive shift has taken place in public opinion and in the
legislative policy of all major parties. Conservatives and liberals, as well as socialists
and communists, all reject unmitigated economic individualism. They hold the state
responsible for creating conditions of stable and full employment; they accept the
responsibility of the community for minimum standards of living, housing, labour
conditions and social insurance.
Ibid. at 822-23. See, also, McWhinney, supra, note 26 at 201.
58 Weschler, 'Towards Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law" (1959) 73 Harv. L. Rev.
1.
59 Supra, note 34 at 831.
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and economic facts and policies. The decisions of the Judicial
Committee, according to Laskin, found their "points of reference
within the four corners of the B.N.A. Act, and [were] uninformed
and unnourished by any facts of Canadian living which might have
afforded a rational basis for ... constitutional determinations."
60
While "constitutional adjudication involve[d] considerations of policy
and hence of social and political and economic beliefs,"61 the Judicial
Committee's interpretations were premised on "cold abstract logic,"62
"rigid abstractions,"63 "a sense of unreality ... which has anchorage
only in the mind,"64 and "inflexible concepts that [were] often the
product of a neat mind, unwilling in the interests of some formal
logic to disarrange thought patterns that had been nicely fitted
together."65 Laskin labelled Lord Watson a "constitutional houdini"66
and Viscount Haldane a user of "magic" who was "ready to solve
any problem by a prepared formula, invariable in its compounds,
regardless of the matter to be solved. 67
The Judicial Committee was, in Laskin's portrayal, off in the
clouds, somewhere far away from the social and economic realities
of contemporary Canadian society. And its failure to consider these
realities in interpreting the Constitution was the cause of his
skepticism about the legitimacy of its decisions. He admonished the
Judicial Committee's "advertence to extrinsic materials"68 and insisted
on the need for courts to take account of "extrinsic materials" in
constitutional cases. 69 Implicit in Laskin's critique of the Judicial
60 Supra, note 31 at 1059-60.
61 Supra, note 30 at 123, 127.
62 Supra, note 31 at 1059.
63 Ibid. at 1060.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid. at 1077.
66 Ibid. at 1076.
67 Ibid. at 1077.
68 Supra, note 30 at 127.
69 Ibid.
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Committee was the view that judicial review could be legitimate, in
spite of the inevitability of judicial policy-making, so long as judges
were rational, honest, and realistic in reaching their decisions. Trust
in judges as impartial and enlightened policy-makers was, for Laskin,
the basis of legitimacy. While accepting that in difficult cases, "the
course must be set by the light of the particular judge's mind,"70 he
trusted that light and was assured in his faith by the judiciary's
"tradition of impartiality and security of tenure which mirrors their
independence. 71  He only insisted that, when choosing between
competing interests and concerns, judges made sure they were
70 Supra, note 30 at 127.
71 Supra, note 31 at 1087. See also W.R. Lederman, "Classifications of Laws and the
British North America Act" in W.R. Lederman, ed., The Courts and the Canadian Constitution
(Toronto: McClellan and Stewart, 1964), in which he argued:
Tie decision as to which classification is to be used for a given purpose has to be
made on non-logical grounds of policy and justice by the legal authority with the
duty and power of decision in that respect. The criteria of relative importance
involved in such a decision cannot be logical ones, for logic merely displays to us
as of equivalent logical value all the possible classifications. There are as many
possible classifications of a rule of law as that rule has distinct characteristics or
attributes which may be isolated as criteria of classification....
Ibid. at 185.
In the making of these very difficult relative-value decisions, all that can rightly be
required of judges is straight thinking, industry, good faith, and a capacity to
discount their own prejudices. No doubt it is also fair to ask that they be men of
high professional attainment, and that they be representative in their thinking of the
better standards of their times and their countrymen.
Ibid. at 261. See also, McWhinney, supra, note 26 at 215:
The argument in favour of the second view is that the judges are an elitist group
of high talents, aspirations, and ideals; that, though they may not be omniscient or
for that matter philosopher-kings, they are normally far better equipped intellectually
than most people in government; and that, so long as they are aware of their own
limitations, there is no grave risk of abuse of their great powers.... This is the civil
libertarian activist conception of the judicial office and it bespeaks an affirmative
right and even duty on the part of the judges to keep the political processes open,
and free and unobstructed. It posits the maintenance of the free society on the
existence of an independent judiciary and the entrusting to the judiciary of the
responsibility, in the ultimate, for preservation of the Open Society ideal.
And see P. Monahan, "At Doctrines Twilight: The Structure of Canadian Federalism" (1984)
34 U.T.L.J. 47 at 64-66.
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apprised of the factual context in which the dispute arose and the
probable consequences of the choices they made. Though "honest
men [might] well disagree on whether available data do or do not
justify legislation of a particular character," such data would ensure,
in Laskin's view, that there was a "rational basis" for the decision as
opposed to its being based on the "unsupported predilections of the
judge."72 And that was enough to legitimate the judge's conclusions.
Friedmann, LaBrie and Laskin were writing around the time
of abolition of appeals to the Judicial Committee in constitutional
cases. Accordingly, their analyses were aimed primarily at the
constitutional doctrine developed by the Judicial Committee. The
Judicial Committee was not, however, responsive to its critics. Only
on the rarest occasions did the Judicial Committee prescribe a broad
and liberal approach to constitutional interpretation in place of the
narrow and legalistic approach that was the norm. It never embraced
a purposive approach that would have satisfied Friedmann or Labrie,
nor an "enlightened policy-maker" approach that would have satisfied
Laskin. 73
The record of the Supreme Court of Canada after appeals
to the Judicial Committee were abolished, is more complicated.
There is some evidence of the purposive style of reasoning
advocated by Friedmann and Labrie. During the 1950s, for example,
there was a move toward constitutional decision-making on the basis
of the purposes and principles which underlay the constitution as a
whole.74 In the 1960s, and most notoriously in its decisions under
72 Supra, note 31 at 1060. Laskin appears to have believed, for example, that the "sorry
story" of the Privy Council's treatment of the New Deal cases might have gone differently if
the social and factual circumstances of this legislation had been brought to bear on these
decisions. If the Privy Council had considered such evidence it would have been impossible
for them to "maintain a mythical consistency predicated on a fixed notion of the meaning of
'property and civil rights in the province."' ]bid. at 1080.
73 See Edwards v. A.-G. Can., [1930] A.C. 124, at 136; British Coal Corp. v. The King,
[1935] A.C. 500 at 518; A.-G Ont v. A.-G. Can. [1947] A.C. 127 at 154. See, also,
McWhinney, supra, note 26 at 66-67.
74 P. Weiler, In the Last Resort (Toronto: Carswell Methuen, 1974) at 227. He states
that:
If we look at the broad sweep of decisions in the fifties, the Court was groping
towards, and I think gradually achieving, what Karl Llewellyn has called the Grand
Style of legal reasoning. The judges appreciated the complexity of the problems
before them, canvassed a wider range of legal materials, adopted a critical view of
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the Canadian Bill of Rights, however, the court returned to its
legalistic and formal style.75 More recently, the Court has adopted
a purposive style of reasoning in some of its non-Charter decisions,
though not in decisions concerning the division of legislative
powers.76 There is little, if any, evidence in Supreme Court of
Canada decisions of the policy-oriented style of constitutional
decision-making advocated by Laskin. Monahan has argued that
there was a paradigm shift, around the time of the Canada
Temperance Federation77 decision in 1946, after which the Judicial
Committee abandoned narrow and technical reasoning "in favour of
an explicit balancing of federal versus provincial interests. 78  No
doubt there were important substantive doctrinal shifts in the Judicial
Committee's constitutional jurisprudence at this time, but I have
found little evidence of explicit interest balancing in the cases. The
attitude towards such arguments, then and now, is best summed up
by the majority of the Supreme Court in a recent division of powers
decision:
the authority of any one of them and took their own personal but complementary
paths to the underlying principle which pointed to the conclusion in the case.
See, also, McWhinney, ibid. at 234, and Snell & Vaughan, supra, note 3 at c. 8, 9.
75 For discussion of the Court's approach to the Canadian Bill of Rights, 1960, see W.S.
Tarnopolsky, 'The Supreme Court and the Canadian Bill of Rights" (1975) 53 Can. Bar Rev.
649; and J.G. Snell & F.F. Vaughan, ibid. at 214-32, esp. 218.
76 Reference Re Language Rights Under the Manitoba Ac 1870 (1985), 19 D.L.R. (4th)
1 (S.C.C.); Reference Re Amendnent of the Constitution of Canada (1981), 125 D.L.R. (3d) 1
(S.C.C.); Attorney-General Quebec v. Blailde (1979), 101 D.L.R. (3d) 394 (S.C.C.) and Societe
des Acadiens du Nouveau-Brunswick v. Association of Parents for Fairness in Education (1986),
27 D.L.R. (4th) 406 (S.C.C.). In the latter decision, the majority judgement explicitly
eschewed the purposive approach to interpretation of language rights, while the minority
judges adopted this approach.
7 7 Attorney General for Ontario v. Canada Temperance Federation, [1946] A.C. 193 (P.C.).
78 P. Monahan, supra, note 71 at 67 [emphasis added]. Monahan argues that the first
case to openly embrace an interest balancing methodology was Attorney-General for Ontario
v. Canada Temperance Federation, ibid. I disagree with this. Quite the contrary to such an
approach was the Committee's bold statement that "the drink" was a subject of national
concern by its "inherent nature" There was no explicit balancing at all. None of this is to
deny that interest-balancing takes place behind a doctrinal facade. This is a different claim,
however. But see, P. Macklem, "Constitutional Ideologies" (1988) 20 Ottawa L. Rev. 117.
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... in a distribution of powers case, once it is demonstrated that the enacting
legislature is competent, the balancing of conflicting values depends on the political
judgement of such legislature and cannot be reviewed by the courts without their
passing upon the wisdom of the legislation.
7 9
Perhaps it was the "regression" by the Supreme Court to
formal and legalistic reasoning in the 1960s which contributed to the
resurgence of calls by constitutional jurists in the 1970s that the
Court abandon narrow and technical reasoning and embrace
purposive reasoning. The substance of the claims by this generation
of constitutional jurists was almost identical to those made twenty
years earlier by Friedmann and LaBrie. Constitutional jurists of the
1970s, like Weiler, Hogg, Lyon and Laskin shared with Friedmann
and LaBrie the views that : 1) narrow and technical reasoning did
not sufficiently constrain judicial choice and discretion; 2)
constitutional adjudication was, in the absence of constraint,
"political;" and 3) judges could and should be constrained in
constitutional cases by the purposes and principles underlying
constitutional prescriptions. Again, like Friedmann and LaBrie, these
jurists differed among themselves on the appropriate sources of
constraint. Weiler and Hogg looked to the purposes and principles
that underlay and rationalized conventional rules and doctrines of
constitutional law, while Lyon and Laskin relied on contemporary
society's "normative consensus."
Weiler, in a fashion reminiscent of earlier generations of
constitutional scholars, attacked the Supreme Court of Canada for
clinging to a narrow and legalistic approach to constitutional
decision-making.80 Such reasoning did not, in his view, constrain
judicial choice and discretion. Quite the contrary, behind the "very
abstract formulae"81 employed in the Court's reasoning were political
and value-laden decisions. The solution was, as it had been for
Friedmann and LaBrie, for the Court to adopt purposive reasoning.
For Weiler, purposive reasoning provided a plausible compromise
79 Re Ontario Public Service Employees Union and Attomey-General for Ontario (1987),
41 D.L.R. (4th) 1 at 39.
80 Supra, note 74 at 229.
81 p. Weiler, 'The Supreme Court and the Law of Canadian Federalism" (1973) 23
U.T.L.J. 307 at 364.
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between formalism at one extreme and unconstrained judicial choice
at the other. While legal rules were sufficiently ambiguous to allow
an intelligent judge to "rationalize almost any decision in the light of
previous authorities," the judge did not "have discretion to choose
any alternative he prefer[ed]."8 2  It was possible to find a middle
position between "two contrasting fallacies:" the first, that there was
"a bright line between the legislative and the judicial power with
judges merely applying established rules;" the second, that a judge
"ought to be acting primarily with the aim of advancing certain
substantive social goals in deciding which rules he will accept and act
upon."83 The solution was for judges to find guidance and constraint
in the impersonal principles, purposes and policies underlying the
legal rule or rules being interpreted.8 4 Once a judge had elaborated
these principles and policies, she or he could follow their "probable
implications ... even when they [were] in opposition to his own
personal values and policy preferences."85
Hogg followed Weiler in advocating purposive reasoning as
the correct interpretive method in pre-Charte, constitutional
82 P. Weiler, "Legal Values and Judicial Decision-Making" (1970) 48 Can. Bar Rev. 1 at
25-26.
83 Ibid. at 56.
84 Ibid. at 19, Weiler said:
...rules must be conceived of as larger than their original statement, since they are
purposive instruments, laden with objectives or policy choices. They are not enacted
as ends in themselves, in the air as it were, but rather because of their supposed
help in attaining certain social goals in the real world in which the law seeks to
make a difference. These purposes form the approved basis for judicial elaboration
of the original rule-statement, a judicial activity which can honestly be termed
interpretation of the original efforts.
85 Ibid. See also ibid. at 23, 26. At 26, Weiler said:
[a judge] does not have discretion to choose any alternative he prefers or to justify
this decision by any argument he believes relevant. Instead, he is obligated to
consider, honestly and openly, the developing principles and policies in the relevant
field, those which have been accepted as authoritative by the participants in the
field. He is similarly obliged to evaluate these principles, and other authoritative
materials, in the light of accepted standards and techniques for determining their
importance and weight. He is then required to make the inference as to which legal
conclusion is most probably demanded by such a reflective examination of the
developing forces within the law, whether or not he personally likes the result.
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adjudication. He too understood purposive reasoning as a
satisfactory answer to the implausibility of formalism and the
undesirability of unfettered judicial choice and discretion. While it
was often the case in constitutional adjudication, according to Hogg,
that "the language of the constitution [did] not speak clearly with
respect to the question at hand, and the precedents [did] not quite
cover the question at hand or were conflicting," constraint was still
possible: 'judicial choice is primarily governed by the body of legal
policies and principles which underlie the more specific rules and
which emerge from the statutes, cases and other conventional
sources of law."86 Relying on these sources would enable the judge
to reach the conrect result, "even if the result [did] not accord with
his own policy preferences."87
Purposive reasoning was also the method of constitutional
interpretation prescribed by Laskin and Lyon in the 1970s. As
indicated earlier, however, these scholars located the source of
constitutional purposes and principles in societal consensus on values,
rather than the history of the constitution (LaBrie), or the principles
underlying conventional sources of constitutional law (Weiler and
Hogg). Their approach was most similar to Friedmann's with its
emphasis on discovering consensual values that could transcend
partisan politics. For Laskin (in 1973), purposive interpretation
required the judge to understand constitutional law as "serving ends
that express the character of our organized society,"88 with the
content of these ends determined by "the development of a
consensus" in society.89  Similarly, Lyon argued that a written
constitution should be understood as designed to protect and
P.W. Hogg, "Is the Supreme Court of Canada Biased in Constitutional Cases?" (1979)
57 Can. Bar Rev. 721 at 722-23.
87 Ibid. at 723. For example, while the question of an Act's "pith and substance" is
"inevitably one of policy," the only "policies" the judge may consider are those that underlie
the division of powers scheme: 'The only 'political' values which may be accepted as legitimate
to judicial review are those that have a constitutional dimension to them, that is, values that
may reasonably be asserted to be enduring consideration in the allocation of power between
the two levels of government." P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto:
Carswell, 1985) at 323.
88 Laskin, 'The Function of Law" (1973) 11 Alta. L. Rev. 118 at 119.
89 Ibid.
[VCOL. 27 NO. 1
Constitutional Legitimacy
promote society's "shared goals."90 These shared goals were to be
found in the "consensus among people as to certain basic values" and
in the reflections of "the true aspirations of a continuing majority (at
least) of the Canadian people,"91 and could, once ascertained,
function to constrain judicial choice and discretion in constitutional
adjudication.92
Purposive reasoning was thus understood by all of the
scholars who were its advocates, as meeting the objections against
formal, narrow and technical reasoning, while, at the same time
avoiding the view, held by Laskin in his early days, that the
Constitution was as open as the minds of those who interpreted it.
The purposive approach to interpretation was portrayed by these
scholars as a more developed and sophisticated scheme for
constraining judicial choice than narrow and technical reasoning -
one that infused with meaning the often vague and indeterminate
constitutional text and doctrine. It "admitted the partial impurity or
implausibility of legal formalism to sustain the fundamental message
of formalism that the rule of law is more than just an imposition of
the subjective values and political biases of judges."93  The next
section will analyze and then criticize the adoption of purposive
90 N. Lyon & R.G. Atkey, Canadian Constitutional Law in a Modem Perspective (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1970) at 70.
91 Ibid. at 67.
92 Ibid. at 68.
In order to provide continuity of basic values a high degree of formalization is
required, and this means that a technique is necessary before ultimate decision on
important questions can be arrived at. Thus there develops a body of decision-
makers who evolve and perpetuate the necessary technique, without which basic
community values could not be guaranteed against erosion. We call these men
judges and put the full power of the community behind their decisions. Access to
these central positions of community power is, needless to say, open only to those
who have demonstrated beyond doubt a skill in the objective perception of
community expectations, coupled with a capacity to subordinate subjective criteria
to perceived community expectations.
93 N.C. Sheppard, "Equality, Ideology and Oppression: Women and the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms" in Boyle et al. eds, Charterwatch: Reflections on Equality (Toronto:
Carswell, 1986) 195 at 206. See, also, K. Klare, "Judicial Deradicalization of the WagnerAct
and the Origins of Modem Legal Consciousness" (1978) 62 Minn. L. Rev. 265 at 280.
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reasoning by the Supreme Court of Canada in the majority of cases
it has decided under the Charter.
II.
The legitimacy of judicial review became a matter of central
concern in Canadian constitutional discourse with the entrenchment
of the Charter in 1982. From that time on, judicial review has
necessarily involved judges in scrutinizing the substance of legislative
and governmental initiatives for their compliance with extremely
vague and open-textured articulations of rights and freedoms. Not
surprisingly, the corresponding expansion of the scope of judicial
activity has intensified concerns about judicial power in constitutional
adjudication. Academic and judicial constitutional discourse
concerning the Charter has focused heavily on defining and
prescribing methods of interpretation that can be relied upon to
legitimate the exercise of judicial power in constitutional cases. As
we shall see, constraint and trust provide the structural dimensions
of this discourse as they did in pre-Charter constitutional thought.
This Part will examine the predominant constraint-based method of
interpretation used by the Court in Charter adjudication. The
method involves, first, purposive interpretation of the Charter's
guarantees of rights and freedoms, and, second, a four-part set of
criteria for applying the open-ended standards of section 1. After
describing and analyzing each of these, I will demonstrate that
neither functions to constrain judicial choice and discretion and,
therefore, that both are insufficient as constraint-based grounds of
formal legitimacy in Charter adjudication.
At the time of the Charter's entrenchment in the
Constitution, and before the Supreme Court had decided any cases
under it, constitutional scholars expressed concern that the Court
might resort to narrow and legalistic techniques of interpretation in
Charter adjudication. They implored the Court to adopt a purposive
approach to interpretation, one that called for elaboration and
application of the purposes and principles which underlay and
informed the various rights and freedoms articulated in the Charter.
Without adopting such an approach, they argued, the Court would
simply impose its conservative views on the Charter - as it had done
[VOL. 27 NO. 1
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on the Canadian Bill of Rights - under the guise of narrow legalism.
The provisions of the constitution were, taken on their own, too
vague and open-textured to avoid such judicial politicking.
Constraint of judicial choice and discretion in Charter adjudication
could be achieved, it was argued, through techniques of
interpretation designed to uncover and apply the purpose or
principle underlying each right or freedom.
94
In its first decisions under the Charter, the Supreme Court
adopted purposive reasoning as the appropriate technique for
interpreting and applying the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the
Charter95  The court insisted in these cases that the constitution
could not be interpreted "by reference to rules of statutory
construction. '"96  It was to avoid the "austerity of tabulated
94 Scholars differed on the question of what sources the courts should look to in
determining the purpose of a right or freedom - history, fundamental values or traditions, or
the principles underlying conventional sources of constitutional law. See, for examples:
Roman, 'The Charter of Rights: Renewing the Social Contract?" (1982-1983) 8 Queen's LJ.
188 at 190, 193, 198 (arguing judges must turn to political and legal history to give meaning
to rights and freedoms); P. Monahan, Book Review (1983) 61 Can. Bar Rev. 434 at 436
(arguing that, in order to apply section 1, the judge needs a background theory of the nature
and requirements of the democratic polity); N. Lyon, 'The Charter as a Mandate for New
Ways of Thinking About Law" (1983) 9 Queen's LJ. 241 at 242 (arguing that judges must
move away from the text of the Charter and to the political tradition the Charter is meant
to reflect); N. Finkelstein, "Section 1: The Standard for Assessing Restrictive Government
Actions and The Charter's Code of Procedure and Evidence" (1983) 9 Queen's LJ. 143 at
143-45 (arguing that the Charter directs the courts to examine the underlying basis of modern
society which is that "people still enter into society for the limited purpose of self
preservation"); C. Beckton, "Freedom of Expression: Access to the Courts" (1983) 61 Can.
Bar Rev. 101 at 122-23 (arguing that the courts must develop theories that are not premised
solely on the judge's perception of which societal values are important); M. Gold, "A
Principled Approach to Equality Rights: A Preliminary Inquiry" (1982) 4 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 131
at 131-34 (arguing that judicial power is limited by the duty to take into consideration certain
basic principles that inform the enterprise upon which the Court is embarked); P. Rogers,
"Equality, Efficiency and Judicial Restraint" (1986) 10 Dalhousie LJ. 139 at 183-87 (arguing
that judicial choice can be constrained by a principle which requires judges to make sure
judicial power is used to strike down statutes which infringe substantive equality).
95 Law Society of Upper Canada v. Skapinker (1984), 9 D.L.R. (4th) 161 at 168 (S.C.C.).
96 Hunter v. Southam (1984), 11 D.L.R. (4th) 641 at 649 (S.C.C.). It is important to
realize however that while purposive reasoning is the predominant structure of constraint-
based arguments in Charter jurisprudence, the Court has persisted in using "narrow and
legalistic" techniques in interpreting the Charter in a number of its decisions. In Dolphin
Delivery, the majority of the Court relied on textual and legalistic arguments to determine the
meanings of ss. 32 and 52 of the Charter. It assumed the words of each provision could
determine the provisions' particular meanings. The court argued, with respect to Section 52,
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legalism, '"97 "narrow and technical" construction,98 and engage in
"broad, liberal and purposive" interpretation. The Court noted that
such an approach was a familiar theme in Canadian constitutional
that the word "law" in the section clearly included the common law. Therefore, according to
the Court, the common law was subject to the Charter. To hold otherwise, the court stated,
"would be wholly unrealistic and contrary to the clear language employed in Section 52(1) of
the Act." Supra, note 2 at 190-91. Similarly, the "clear language" of section 32 was invoked
in support of the Court's conclusion that the Charter did not apply to the courts. The text
of section 32 was, in the court's view, "conclusive on this issue:" the words parliament,
legislature, and government specified that the Charter applied only to the "legislative, executive
and administrative branches of the government."
Section 32(1) refers to the Parliament and Government of Canada and
to the legislatures and governments of the provinces in respect of all matters within
their respective authorities. In this, it may be seen that Parliament and the
Legislatures are treated as separate or specific branches of government, distinct
from the executive branch of government, and therefore where the word
"government" is used in s.32 it refers not to government in its generic sense,
meaning the whole of the governmental apparatus of the state, but to a branch of
government. The word "government," following as it does the word "Parliament" and
"Legislature," must then, it would seem, refer to the executive or administrative
branch of government.... This is the sense in which the words "Government of
Canada" are ordinarily employed in other sections of the Constitution Act of 1867....
The words "Government of Canada," particularly where they follow a reference to
the word "Parliament," almost always refer to the executive government.
Ibid. at 194. The strict construction approach to interpretation has been employed by
members of the Court in a number of cases, though Justice McIntyre is its most consistent
user. See Mills v. The Queen (1986), 29 D.L.R. (4th) 161 (S.C.C.), for example, where Justice
McIntyre argued in the plurality opinion that, on the basis of the clear words of section 24(1)
of the Charter, a failure to try an accused "within a reasonable time" for a purpose of s. 11(b)
of the Charter did not necessarily deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to try the accused.
In Dubois v. The Queen (1985), 23 D.L.R. (4th) 503 (S.C.C.), Justice McIntyre dissented from
the Court's decision that section 13 of the Charter prevented the Crown from reading in the
accused's testimony from a first trial at a retrial ordered by the Court of Appeal. His reasons
again emphasized that the result followed clearly from the text. In his concurring reasons in
the Reference Re Public Service Employee RelationsAc; Labour Relations Act and Police Officers
Collective Bargaining Act (1987), 38 D.L.R. (4th) 161 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter Alberta Reference],
Justice McIntyre argued that his conclusion that freedom of association did not protect the
right to strike was supported by the absence of an independent textual reference to the right
to strike. Ibid. at 231-32. He relied on a similar argument to deny protection of the right
to have an abortion by S.7 of the Charter, in R. v. Morgentaler (1988), 44 D.L.R. (4th) 385
at 469 (S.C.C.).
97 Ibid. at 650, citing Minister of Home Affairs v. Fisher (1979), [1980] A.C. 319 at 329.
98 Supra, note 95 at 168.
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jurisprudence, "applied in countless cases."99  It was also, in the
Court's view, "consonant with the classical principles of American
constitutional construction enunciated by Chief Justice Marshall in
M'Culloch v. State of Maryland," as well as consistent with
contemporary cases decided by the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council under constitutions of countries that still referred appeals in
constitutional cases to that body.100
The purposive approach to constitutional interpretation
required, according to the Court, that the interpreter determine the
interests and values the provision being interpreted was meant to
protect.101 The Court acknowledged that many of the Charter's
provisions were vague and open-textured, and that it was implausible
to believe meaning could be determined by reference to the text
alone.10 2 The problem could be solved, however, by supplementing
interpretation of the text with reference to extrinsic sources, namely,
the history, traditions, and fundamental values of society.
1 0 3
According to McIntyre J. "[a charter guarantee] which by itself does
not in any way define [its scope] must be construed with reference
to the constitutional text and to the nature, history, traditions, and
social philosophies of our society."104 The Court presumed in the
cases in which it developed and applied the purposive approach that
every right or freedom had a distinct and uncontroversial purpose
which could be disclosed by interpretation of these extrinsic sources.
99 Ibid. at 167. Though only one case, the "Person's case," Edwards v. A.-G. Can., supra,
note 73, was cited. Indeed, as the history of criticism of constitutional interpretation suggests,
the "living tree" doctrine developed in the "Person's case" was not as alive as suggested by the
Court's comment. See supra, notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
100 Hunter v. Southam, supra, note 96 at 650, citing M'Culloch, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
101 The purpose is to be understood "in the light of the interests [the right or freedom]
was meant to protect" (Regina v. Big M Drug Mart (1985), 18 D.L.R. (4th) 321 at 359), and
the "cardinal values" it embodies (Regina v. Oakes (1986), 26 D.L.R. (4th) 200 at 212).
102 R. v. Big M, ibid. at 359. Hunter v. Southam, supra, note 96 at 649.
103 . v. Big M, ibid. at 359-60.
104 Alberta Reference supra, note 96 at 224.
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In such sources the court would find the principles and policies105
each provision was meant to serve, and these could then be applied
to determine the outcome of particular constitutional disputes. The
relationship envisioned 'between purposive reasoning and constraint
on judicial choice in Charter discourse was similar to that we have
seen in earlier discussions of purposive reasoning. In short, it was
assumed that, where the constitutional text was vague, indeterminate
and, therefore, incapable of constraining judicial choice, the decision-
maker could nonetheless be constrained by the purposes and
principles that underlay the text.106 The notion that the law of the
Constitution ruled, rather than the predilections of judges, was
thereby maintained.10 7
Members of the Supreme Court have insisted on numerous
occasions that the Court's only legitimate function is to apply the
law of the Constitution, not to question the wisdom and policies of
the legislature.108  Purposive reasoning is understood as fully
concordant with these strong affirmations of the constraint exercised
by the Constitution on the decision-making of judges. On several
occasions, members of the Court have explicitly drawn the link
between purposive reasoning and constraint. In the Motor Vehicle
Reference, for example, Lamer J. stated that the task of securing the
full benefits of the Charter for individuals while "avoiding
adjudication of the merits of public policy" could "only be
accomplished by a purposive analysis."1°9 Similarly, in Morgentaler,
McIntyre J. noted that the purposive approach requires courts to
105 The Court often uses the terminology of values and interests rather than principles
and policies. For the purposes of this paper values and principles will be treated as describing
the same thing, as will interests and policies.
106 A similar approach is taken in P. Hogg, "he Charter of Rights and American
Theories of Interpretation" (1987) 25 Osgoode Hall LJ. 87.
107 ibid. at 29.
108 The Court, and members of it, have insisted on a number of occasions, that its only
legitimate role is to apply the law and that it must not question the wisdom and policies of
the legislature: Operation Dismantle v. The Queen (1985), 18 D.L.R. (4th) 481 at 494 and 503
(S.C.C.); Hunter v. Southain, supra, note 96 at 659-60; Law Society of Upper Canada v.
Skapinker, supra, note 95 at 170; Reference re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (1985),
24 D.L.R. (4th) 536 at 544, and R v. Morgentaler, supra, note 96 at 393-94.
109 B.C. Motor Vehicle Reference, ibid. at 546.
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"interpret the Charter in a manner calculated to give effect to its
provisions, not to the idiosyncratic view of the judge who is writing,"
and that purposive reasoning "prevents the Court from abandoning
its traditional adjudicatory function in order to formulate its own
conclusions on questions of public policy, a step which this Court has
said on numerous occasions it must not take."' '11
Thus the Court, like the constitutional jurists we looked at
earlier, has understood purposive reasoning as a "compromise"
between the implausible view that judicial decision-making can be
constrained by the constitutional text and doctrine, and the
unacceptable view that judicial decision-making is nothing more than
judicial policy-making. The burden of the argument in favour of this
compromise is that purposive reasoning does constrain judicial choice
and discretion. This is, I believe, a burden that cannot be satisfied.
Indeed, the position that the constitutional text and doctrine are
insufficient to constrain judicial choice, but that constitutional
purposes and principles are sufficient, is an example of the truism
that unsolvable problems lead to untenable solutions. The point is
put well by Gary Peller : "... the demonstration of the inherent
indeterminacy of legal rules would at first glance seem to apply just
as easily to attempts to ground legal decision-making in the
identification and application of purposes, policies and principles."
11
'
The same holds true at second glance. The belief that purposive
reasoning provides for constrained judicial decision-making, and
thereby avoids the difficulties raised by judicial choice and discretion,
is grounded in two implausible assumptions: first, that the purpose
of a constitutional provision can be identified without the
interposition of judicial subjectivity; and second, that the purpose,
once identified, can be applied to determine uncontroversially the
results of particular disputes.
The first assumption is manifest in the pre-Charter discussions
of purposive reasoning we looked at earlier. The jurists discussed
were united in their belief that the principle or policy identified as
the purpose of a constitutional provision, or the constitution as a
110R. v. Morgentaler, supra, note 96 at 466-67.
111 G. Peller, 'The Metaphysics of American Law" (1985) 73 Cal. L. Rev. 1152 at 1152-
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whole, could be grounded in a consensus about history, the
fundamental values of society or the conventional sources of
constitutional law. Thus, it was thought possible to identify a
purpose that was constitutionally "true," rather than the product of
choice and a subject of controversy. Scott, MacDonald, Kennedy
and La Brie, for example, supported their views on what the
constitution required by referring to the "uncontroversial" (at least
in their minds) intentions of the constitutional framers. Friedmann,
and later Lyon and Laskin, believed the purposes of constitutional
norms could be found in a consensus of public opinion about shared
goals and values - principles that "would find acceptance by all
major political parties."112  For Weiler and Hogg the relevant
principles were those that could be uncontroversially identified as
underlying the conventional sources of constitutional law.
The Court has adopted all of these sources - history,
fundamental principles of society, and underlying principles of
constitutional law - as appropriate places to find the purposes of
Charter rights and freedoms. The purpose of a right or freedom
must be ascertained through analysis of its "historical origins," the
"values that underlie our political and philosophic traditions"113 as
well as the "larger objects of the Charter itself' and the language
and textual context of the right or freedom in question. The Court
appears to operate on the assumption that, through analysis of these
sources, it will be possible for judges, and other constitutional
interpreters, to reach conclusions on what purpose a given right or
freedom is supposed to serve without exercising choice or discretion.
The judicial task is simply to identify the principles and purposes
that all would agree informed the right or freedom being
interpreted.14 This is, of course, an impossible task. The question
112 Supra, note 34.
113 Big M, supra, note 101 at 361.
114 In D. Beatty & S. Kennett, "Striking Back: Fighting Words, Social Protest and
Political Participation in Free and Democratic Societies" (1988) 67 Can. Bar Rev. 573, the
authors explicitly draw the connection between determinacy and consensus. They argue that
determinacy in constitutional interpretation depends on the possibility of elaborating
definitions of rights and freedoms 'Which everyone could accept." Ibid. at 584. Beatty and
Kennett believe such definitions can be found and, therefore, that "determinate solutions -
right answers - do exist ..." in constitutional law. Ibid. at 576.
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"what is the purpose of a right or freedom" is not one that yields a
uniquely correct and uncontroversial answer. Questions about the
history of a right or freedom, or the political and philosophic values
it supposedly embodies, are political and value-laden: they are not
matters of legal right and wrong.115
Let us look at the Charter's guarantee of freedom of
association, and the Court's interpretation of that freedom, to
illustrate the point. In the Alberta Reference11 6 the Court was asked
to decide whether freedom of association included the right to strike.
In reaching their conclusion that it did not, the two judges writing
in the majority, Le Dain J. and McIntyre J., reasoned that the
purpose of freedom of association was to protect the freedom of
individuals to associate with one another, not the freedom of the
association to pursue its essential activities. Dickson, C.J.C, in
dissent, understood the purpose of freedom of association in quite
different terms. For him, the purpose of freedom of association was
to protect the activities of associations necessary for achieving their
collective goals. On comparing McIntrye J.'s judgement to Dickson
C.J.C.'s judgement, it is apparent that the disagreement about the
purpose of freedom of association can best be understood as a
115 S. Wright, "'he Judicial Right and the Rhetoric of Restraint: A Defense of Judicial
Activism in an Age of Conservative Judges" (1987) 14 Hastings Const. L.Q. 487 at 502:
The problem with reference to tradition and consensus as a neutral repository of
value in judicial decision-making is twofold. First, judicial review of legislative
enactments requires that judges have some theory that can plausibly criticize
majoritarian choices. Reference to tradition or consensus to decide difficult
constitutional questions dangerously limits the critical "bite" required for effective
judicial review. Majoritarian conservative judges, however, might not find this
limitation objectionable. A more significant difficulty is that reference to "tradition"
or "consensus" assumes there is such a thing (or things). After all, we are wary of
the non-elected judiciary making value choices precisely because they are so
contested in our society. We want judges to decide cases without reference to
values because we acknowledge that individuals disagree about them. Thus it makes
little sense for judges to refer to some purported agreement on fundamental issues
when it is existing disagreement about them that impels the search for a neutral
referent.
116 Supra, note 96.
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conflict between two competing political visions: "individualism" and
"collectivism. 117
In his reasons McIntyre J. held that the Charter was designed
to protect individual rights and did not extend to group rights.
Therefore, according to him, freedom of association was "a freedom
belonging to the individual and not to the group formed through its
exercise."118 Its purpose was to protect the "attainment of individual
goals" through group activity.119  Accordingly, the purpose of
freedom of association was to protect the rights of individuals to
form and join groups, to exercise their individual constitutional rights
in groups, and to do in association what they were lawfully entitled
to do as individuals. By definition, then, any understanding of
freedom of association that "accord[ed] an independent constitutional
status to the aims, purposes and activities of the association" had to
be rejected. 2° In contrast, Dickson C.J.C. understood the purpose
of freedom of association as including protection of the activities of
collective entities qua collective entities. He pointed to "our
constitution's history of giving special recognition to collectivities or
communities of interest other than the government and political
parties"121 and emphasized that "association ha[d] always been the
means through which political, cultural and racial minorities, religious
groups and workers have sought to attain their purposes and fulfil
their aspirations."122 Freedom of association did not, therefore, find
its only point of reference in the individual:
There will ... be occasions when no analogy involving individuals can be found for
associational activity, or when a comparison between groups and individuals fails to
capture the essence of a possible violation of associational rights. This is precisely
117 For explications of constitutional theories grounded in each of these respective
ideologies, see D. Beatty, Putting the Charter to Work (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's
University Press, 1987), P. Monahan, Politics and the Constitution: The Charter, Federalism
and the Supreme Court of Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1987). For a discussion of ideology in
constitutional law, see P. Macklem, supra, note 78.
1 1 8 Alberta Reference, supra, note 96 at 219.
119 Ibid. at 218.
120 Ibid. at 225.
121 Ibid. at 196.
122 Ibid. at 197.
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the situation in this case. There is no individual equivalent to a strike. The refusal
to work by one individual does not parallel a collective refusal to work. The latter
is qualitatively rather than quantitatively different.
12 3
For Dickson C.J.C, freedom of association was vested in the
association - the union - not each individual member, and its
purpose was to protect the essential activities of the associations -
strikes and collective bargaining.
The conflicting characterizations of the purpose of freedom
of association in the Alberta Reference illustrates the implausibility of
the assumption that judicial choice and discretion can be avoided
through purposive reasoning. If judges must choose between
different and often conflicting formulations of the purpose of a right
or freedom, the problem of judicial subjectivity is reproduced rather
than avoided. This difficulty is not, of course, confined to freedom
of association. A smidgen of imagination reveals the impossibility of
discovering the unique and uncontroversial purpose of any of the
rights and freedoms. Is the purpose of freedom of expression to
protect the functioning of democratic institutions, and thus confined
to political speech, or is it aimed at providing a "marketplace of
ideas" in all sectors and thus inclusive of commercial or artistic
speech?124 Is the purpose of freedom of religion confined to
ensuring that people are free to engage in religious exercises and
practices, or does it extend to a requirement of state neutrality in
matters of religion and thus preclude state support of (as well as
interference with) religion?12s Is the purpose of equality to ensure
similar treatment of all groups, or does it require differential
123 Ibid. at 198.
124 Compare Ford v. Attorney-General of Quebec (unreported, S.C.C., Dec. 15, 1988,
Invin Toy Ltd v. Attorney-General of Quebec (1986), 32 D.L.R. (4th) 641 (C.A.), and Re Klein
and Law Society of Upper Canada (1985), 16 D.L.R. (4th) 489 (Ont. Div. Ct.) with Re Rocket
and Royal College of Dental Surgeons (1988) 49 D.L.R. (4th) 641 (Ont. C.A.), and Re Griffin
and College of Dental Surgeons (1988) 47 D.L.R. (4th) 331 (B.C.S.C.)
125 Big M, supra, note 101; and Edwards Books and Art v. R. (1986), 35 D.L.R. (4th) 1.
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treatment to ameliorate existing maldistributions of social and
economic power? 126
All of these questions raise highly contentious political issues
that will often generate very different answers within the judicial and
legal community. The implausibility of consensus on such questions
becomes even more pronounced when we leave the judicial and legal
community. It is an odd notion that a meaningful social consensus
about political and moral values, history and traditions, exists in
Canada, transcending the conflicting interests and perspectives that
constitute Canada's social and economic order. Canadian society is
not only "multi-cultural' 127 and composed of people of "diverse socio-
cultural backgrounds,"'128  as the court acknowledges. It is also
structured by social relations of domination and subordination.
While all groups and individuals are treated as formal equals by the
law, the actual inequality of life options and social and economic
conditions suffered by workers, women, immigrants, Aboriginal
Peoples, ethnic and racial minority groups, et cetera is undeniable.129
The idea of social consensus suggests that, despite the actual
structures of difference and domination that define peoples lives,
agreement on the fundamentals of the social, economic and political
order exists among all individuals and groups in society, or at least
a substantial majority of them.
The premise of purposive reasoning is that the principle or
policy identified as the purpose underlying a right or freedom is
supported by a social consensus, or at least a consensus about its
place in the history and traditions of society. The plausability of
such consensus occurring cannot be sustained, however, once we
account for the structures of difference and domination that
126 See, for example: Enel Ltd v. Johnson (1986), 25 D.L.R. (4th) 233 (Ont. Div. Ct.);
Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia (1986), 27 D.L.R. (4th) 600 (C.A.), appeal to
the S.C.C. granted November 28, 1986; Blainey v. Ontario Hockey Association (1986), 26
D.L.R. (4th) 728 (Ont. C.A.); and Action Travail des Femmes v. Canadian National Railway
Co. (1987), 40 D.L.R. (4th) 193 (S.C.C.). See also N.C. Sheppard, supra, note 93.
12 7 R v. Big M, supra, note 101 at 355.
128 Ibid. at 365.
129 See, for examples of non-dominant perspectives on social, economic and political
issues in Canada, D. Drache & D. Cameron, The Other MacDonald Report (Toronto: J.
Lorimer, 1985).
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constitute the social and economic order. The identification of a
right or freedoms' purpose requires, as the Court has told us,
determination of the interests the right or freedom is meant to
protect. Convergence of interests is a rather strange idea in a
society where some are dominant and others dominated. The notion
that groups and individuals in society genuinely consent to
arrangements amicable to their interests and concerns is not
plausible. Yet that is the premise of the view that a consensual, or
uncontroversial, purpose can be identified for a given right or
freedom. When a right or freedom is said to protect a particular
interest the assumption is that a consensus exists on the paramountcy
of that interest and its relationship to the right or freedom. Such
consensus cannot, however, exist in a social order premissed on
conflicting interests between those with power and those without.
As John Ely has pointed out: "... there is no consensus to be
discovered (and to the extent that one may seem to exist, that is
likely to reflect only the domination of some groups by others). '' 30
None of this is to deny that the appearance of consensus
might be achieved, even in a divided and diverse society like ours,
by characterizing principles and policies at such a level of abstraction
and generality as to enable them to mean anything to anybody. This
move, however, triggers the second challenge to the assumption that
purposive reasoning can constrain judicial choice and discretion.1 31
130 J.H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1980) at 63. See also: G. Braden, 'The Search for Objectivity in
Constitutional Law" (1948) 57 Yale LJ. 571 at 584-89 (arguing that Frankfurter J.'s reliance
on consensus as constraining his choice was incoherent because of the multiplicity of
perspectives from which consensus could be gauged); G.E. White, "From Realism To Critical
Legal Studies: A Truncated History" (1986) 40 Southwestern LJ. 819 at 829 (arguing that the
realization in the 1960's that a whole class of people, blacks, had been existing outside the
American mainstream, shattered the sense that consensus was possible in American Society).
See also S. Martin & K. Mahoney, Equality and Judicial Neutrality (Toronto: Carswell, 1987).
For discussions of the notion of consensus and its relationship to ideology, see C. Sumner,
Readig Ideologies: An Investigation into the Marxst Theory of Ideology and Law (London and
New York: Acedemic Press, 1979).
131 For examples of the argument that policies and principles discovered through
purposive style reasoning are either formulated in a way that is controversial because of their
particularity, or indeterminate (and thereby controversial in their application) because of their
generality, see Unger, Knowledge and Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1975) at 94-98;
Unger, Law in Modem Society (New York. The Free Press, 1976) at 192-200 and 203-10;
Unger, "he Critical Legal Studies Movement" (1983) 96 Harv. L. Rev. 561 at 568-73; and
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This challenge is encountered at the stage of applying the purpose
identified to resolving a given dispute. It seems obvious that the
purposive approach is of little assistance if the purpose identified is
no more constraining than the provision itself. Vague definitions of
purpose are no better than vague textual provisions. This point was
made by Dickson CJ.C. in the context of division of powers
jurisprudence when he noted that certain judicially created
definitions of section 91(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867 were
unhelpful because they were "hardly ... narrower than ... a literal
reading of the words 'regulation of trade and commerce' alone."132
In the context of the Charte, the same critique might be applied
to the definitions arrived at by the Court through purposive
reasoning.
In the B.C. Motor Vehicle Reference,133 for example, the
majority promised "objective and manageable standards" through
purposive analysis. What we actually got, from a purposive analysis
of the admittedly ambiguous phrase "principles of fundamental
justice," however, was the equally ambiguous statement that such
principles "are to be found in the basic tenets of our legal system."1 34
It is difficult to see how the words "basic tenets of our legal system"
are any more specific or determinate than "principles of fundamental
justice:" how does the former phrase have any more power to
constrain judicial choice and discretion than the original text of the
Charter? The definition falls far short of the Court's promise that
it would provide "meaningful content for the section 7 guarantee all
the while avoiding adjudication of policy matters.' 135
A second illustration is the decision in Hunter v. Southam. 3 6
In that case the Court interpreted the "right to be secure against
unreasonable search or seizure" through purposive analysis. The
J.H. Ely, ibid. at 63-69.
132Attorney-General of Canada v. Canadian National Transportation Ltd (1983), 3 D.L.R.
(4th) 16 at 58 (S.C.C.).
133 Supra, note 108.
134 Ibid. at 550.
135 Ibid.
136 Supra, note 96.
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Court noted that the word "unreasonable" was "vague and open" and
could not be defined by "recourse to a dictionary, nor for that
matter by reference to rules of statutory construction."1 37
Nonetheless, the Court believed it would be "possible to assess the
reasonableness or unreasonableness of the impact of a search" by
identifying the purpose underlying section 8.138 After analysis of a
number of different sources, the Court concluded that the purpose
of s. 8 was "to protect individuals from unjustified State intrusions
upon their privacy."1 39 Given the vague and ambiguous language
of this definition, it is difficult to see how the definition is any more
constraining than the provision itself. Indeed, the Court's conclusion
that, for a search to be valid under section 8, there must be "prior
authorization, usually in the form of a valid warrant, 1 4o issued by a
"neutral and detached" person,1 41 and based on "reasonable and
probable grounds, established upon oath"142 for the grantor's belief
that the search would disclose the evidence being sought, does not
appear to follow necessarily from the purpose of the right or
freedom identified by the Court.2 43 The question of what types of
state interference are or are not justified is not susceptible to an
uncontroversial and legally correct answer. It is - like the question
of what are the "basic tenets of our legal system" - a matter of
opinion on which people will differ.
1 44
Many more examples might be used to illustrate that
purposive reasoning does not avoid the difficulties raised by the
vague and indeterminate nature of the constitutional text. The
137 Ibid. at 649.
138 Ibid. at 650-51.
139 Ibid. at 653.
140 Ibid.
141 Ibid. at 656.
142 Ibid. at 659.
143 P. Hogg, supra, note 106 at 102-04, 113 for a defense of the reasoning and outcome
in Hunter v. Southam.
144 See A- Petter, 'The Politics of the Charter' (1986) Sup. Ct. L Rev. 473 at 490-98;
and P. Monahan & A. Petter, "Developments in Constitutional Law: The 1985-86 Term"
(1987) 9 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. at 76-77.
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rights and freedoms entrenched in the Charter invite disagreement
and controversy when questions are raised about the purpose they
are supposed to serve. And if such disagreement is avoided by
articulating the purpose at a high level of abstraction and generality,
it re-emerges when arguments must be made about -what that
purpose requires in a particular situation. For these reasons,
purposive reasoning does little to support the plausibility of a
constraint-based theory of legitimacy. It does not avoid the
interposition of judicial subjectivity between the prescriptions of the
constitution and the outcomes of constitutional adjudication.
Therefore, purposive reasoning cannot sustain the burden of the
argument that adjudicative outcomes are detennined by the
constitution. As we will see in Parts III and V, two responses might
be made to this criticism, both in defence of the legitimacy of
judicial review. First, it can be argued that constraint is not
necessary for judicial review to be legitimate. Judicial choice and
discretion are appropriate if informed and rational. Second, the
argument can be made that constitutional interpretation is objective
and constrained despite its indeterminacy. Before analyzing these
two arguments however, I will examine Section 1 of the Charter in
the context of constraint-based theories of legitimacy.
As noted above, the predominant form of Charter
interpretation in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence involves two
steps: first, the content of the right or freedom must be defined by
ascertaining its purpose (the process we have just looked at); and
second, if a limit on the right or freedom is found, the Court must
apply the standards articulated in Section 1 and ask whether the
limit is "reasonable" and "demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society." The impugned government action will be
upheld if it meets these standards, despite its limiting a right or
freedom. Section 1 poses a significant problem for those who rely
on constitutional constraint to legitimate judicial review. One would
be hard-pressed to come up with standards any more open-textured
and indeterminate than those prescribed in Section 1. Whether a
governmental action is "reasonable" and "demonstrably justified in a
free and democratic society" is a matter of opinion and political
choice, not a technical legal question. In a number of its decisions,
the Court has attempted to mediate the contradiction between its
commitment to constraint based legitimation strategies and the
[VOL. 27 NO. 1
Constitutional Legitimacy
inevitably political nature of the questions that arise in the section
1 inquiry.
The leading case is Regina v. Oakes.145 In that case Dickson
C.J.C., writing for the majority, established a set of criteria to
structure the Section 1 inquiry in all Charter cases. In place of the
open-ended and politicized question of whether a particular
government action was "reasonable" and "demonstrably justified in a
free and democratic society," the Court imposed a four-step legal
test. A government action would be upheld under Section 1, only
if: 1) the purpose of the impugned action was "of sufficient
importance to warrant overriding a constitutionally protected right
of freedom;" 2) the measures adopted were "rationally connected to
the objective;" 3) the measures, "even if rationally connected to the
objective in the first sense, ... impair[ed] as little as possible the
right or freedom in question;" and 4) the "deleterious effects" of a
measure "[were] outweighed by the importance of the objective. 146
The translation of the ambiguous and general language of the
Section 1 text into a neat four-step test was clearly an attempt by
the majority to avoid having to confront directly evaluating a
restriction's reasonableness and demonstrable justification in Oakes
and in future cases. Such an evaluation, after all, has the
appearance of an inquiry into the wisdom and political desirability of
the legal prescription responsible for the restriction. The Oakes test
functions to make the inquiry look legal rather than political, an
appearance further supported by the majority's precise specifications
concerning the onus and standard of proof.
147
The appearance of legalistic constraint is, however, an
illusion. As we saw in the analysis of purposive reasoning above,
attempts to inject content into vague and indeterminate textual
provisions cannot escape the indeterminacy of those provisions.
Such attempts inevitably raise two questions: first, why is one
definition of a vague standard necessarily better than any other; and,
second, how can we avoid the vagueness and indeterminacy of the
145 Supra, note 101.
146 Ibid. at 227-28.
147 Ibid. at 226-27. Though the Court leaves open the possibilty of the government not
adducing evidence where elements of s. 1 analysis are "obvious or self-evident."
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definitions themselves? Both questions are raised by the Court's
interpretation and application of Section 1 in Oakes and the cases
following it. In the first place, it is not clear why the four criteria
in the Oakes test constitute a uniquely correct interpretation of
Section 1. The words "reasonable limit" and "demonstrably justified
in a free and democratic society" do not necessarily, nor even
obviously, translate into the four-step test elaborated by the majority.
The argument that the four-step test was determined by the text of
section 1 and the purposes which supposedly underlie it is highly
implausible.1 48 The majority appear to believe that the four criteria
follow from the need for a "stringent" (i.e., difficult for the
government to meet) standard of justification under Section 1, which,
in turn, follows from the Charter's purpose of protecting rights and
freedoms and "the fundamental principles of a free and democratic
society." This chain of reasoning may be appealing, but it is hardly
one that would qualify as uniquely determined.149
Secondly, the criteria identified in Oakes are themselves
indeterminate and do not avoid the intervention of judicial choice
and discretion in Section 1 analyses. The first and fourth criteria
clearly do not avoid judicial choice and discretion - indeed they
invite it. Whether or not the purpose of legislation is "sufficiently
significant to warrant overriding a constitutionally guaranteed right,"
and whether its importance out-weighs the "deleterious effects" of a
148 See Black v. Alberta Law Society (1986), 27 (4th) 527 (Alta. C.A.) where Kerans J.
argues for a different set of criteria for applying section 1 than that established in R v. Oakes,
supra, note 101.
149 In what sense, for example, does a stringent standard of justification follow necessarily
from the "fundamental principles of a free and democratic society" as defined by the Court?
To reach this conclusion the Court must assume these "fundamental principles" require that
it be difficult for the government to justify under section 1 legislation which infringes a right
or freedom. The difficulty with this assumption is that the "fundamental principles of a free
and democratic society" could just as easily be understood as requiring judicial deference to
decisions of the legislature and, therefore, a lax standard under section 1. Indeed, the Court
refers to "faith in social and political institutions which enhance the participation of individuals
and groups in society' as a "fundamental principle." Such "faith" would appear to cut in
favour of judicial deference, not intervention. As we shall see below, the Court often calls
for a deference to legislative choice in the name of democracy. Thus, the need for a stringent
standard of justification under section 1 - one that places a difficult hurdle in the way of
governmental justification of a limit on a right or freedom under section 1 - does not follow
in any obvious or necessary way from the "fundamental principles of a free and democratic
society." See P. Monahan & A. Petter, supra, note 144 at 104.
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particular measure, are matters of opinion not legal necessity. The
explicit policy orientation of these questions is likely responsible for
the Court's reluctance to rely on them as justifications for not
upholding legislation under Section 1. With respect to the first, the
Court has confidently found, in each case it has applied this
criterion, that the "sufficient importance" of the legislation in
question was "self-evident."' 50  And the balancing of legislative
objective against effects contemplated by the fourth criterion has
been avoided by the Court as a ground for not upholding legislation
under Section 1.151
The second and third criteria in the Oakes test, on the other
hand, have played a central role in the Court's reasons for striking
down legislation in a number of cases. Both these criteria concern
the relationship between the means chosen by the legislature and the
objective of the legislation. The requirement of means/ends
proportionality has the appearance of technical and scientific
objectivity. The question is simply one of fit: is there a sufficiently
tight fit between the means and the end? Accordingly, these criteria
are more able to sustain the appearance of constraint than the first
and fourth criteria 52 Once again, however, the appearance of
constraint is illusory. In determining whether or not a legislative
measure fits the purpose it was designed to achieve, the courts
cannot avoid making controversial choices concerning the wisdom
and desirability of the legislation. In the first place, the terms of the
criteria - "rationally connected" and "impair as little as possible" -
are indeterminate. Clearly, people will differ on how connected the
means and the ends must be to qualify as constituting a rational
connection, or on how little a legislative measure must impair a right
150 See R v. Oakes, supra, note 101 at 229; Dolphin Delivery, supra, note 2 at 188; R. v.
Edwards, supra, note 125 at 42; B.C. Motor Vehicle Reference, supra, note 108 at 563; R. v.
Jones (1986), 69 N.R. 241 at 255. Note that in Big M, the Court found the purpose was
illegitimate on federalism grounds and therefore the legislation could not be protected under
section 1. "Legitimacy" and "importance' are understood by the Court as different inquiries:
see Regina v. Big M, supra, note 101 at 366.
151 The fourth test is, of course, applied when legislation is upheld under Oakes because
of the necessity of satisfying each criterion. Even in these situations, however, the Court deals
with it very quickly and then moves on: see R. v. Edwards, ibid.
152 McWhinney, supra, note 26 at 223; Monahan, supra, note 117 at 66-67; and Beatty,
supra, note 117.
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or freedom before it is said to impair that right or freedom "as little
as possible."153
Furthermore, the way the Court characterizes the purpose of
a legislative provision will tilt the argument about means/ends
proportionality in one direction or the other. The tightness of the
fit between means and ends will inevitably depend on the level of
generality at which the purpose is defined. If the purpose is
tautologically equivalent to the legislative provision, then there will
be an absolute fit - no other provision would be capable of
achieving the purpose. On the other hand, if the purpose is defined
in general and abstract terms, while the legislative provision is very
specific, the fit will appear much looser. None of this would be a
problem if there were some determinate source for identifying the
purpose of a given legislative provision. The difficulty, however, is
that the characterization of the purpose of a legislative provision is
itself a discretionary exercise. The Court might refer to any number
of sources in support of a particular characterization - legislative
records, counsel for the government, pre-legislative reports, the
preamble to the Act, a construction of the whole Act or a particular
part of it, et cetera.15 4 Within and among each of these it will be
possible to find support for a multiplicity of characterizations of
legislative objective. And there is no source for determining which
of these is uniquely correct. e55
In R. v. Edwards Books and Art,156 for example, the Court
characterized the purpose of Sunday closing legislation in different
ways at different points in the judgement. Altogether there were
153 See Monahan, ibid. at 62-71 and S. Peck, "An Analytical Framework for the
Application of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (1987) 25 Osgoode Hall L.J.
1.
154 The Court relied on a number of sources to determine what was the purpose of the
provision: "the title and text of the Act, the legislative debates and Ontario Law Reform
Commission's Report on Sunday Observance Legislation (1970)."
155 This type of argument is developed in Note, "Legislative Purpose, Rationality and
Equal Protection" (1972) 82 Yale L.J. 123. See also P. Monahan & A. Petter, supra, note
144; H. Ely, "Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law" (1970) 79 Yale
LJ. 1205 at 1237; S. Peck, supra, note 153 at 72; and J.W. Torke, "The Judicial Process in
Equal Protection Cases" (1982) 9 Hastings Constitutional L.Q. 279 at 292.
156 Supra, note 125.
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four characterizations of the legislative purpose: 1) to enforce a
uniform day of rest for as many as people as possible;157 2) to
enforce a uniform day of rest for workers;158 3) to enforce a uniform
day of rest for retail workers;1 59 4) to enforce a uniform day of rest
for retail employees and firms with fewer than 8 employees and
fewer than 5,000 sq. ft. of floor space.160  The fourth
characterization of purpose is equivalent to the terms of the
provision itself.
The Court decided that the legislative scheme impaired
religious freedom "as little as possible." In coming to this conclusion,
it acknowledged that an alternative legislative scheme, proposed by
the appellant, and admittedly less restrictive of religious freedom,
would have served the purpose of protecting Sundays off for retail
workers (number 3 above). It would not, however, in the Court's
view, have sered the pupose of protecting Sundays off for those retail
workers who were protected by the scheme cunrently in place.
According to Dickson C.J.C, speaking for the majority : "What
concerns me ... is the limitation of [the alternatives] scope in terms
of the employees who would be denied the benefit which the Act
was designed to provide them."1 61 In other words, the alternative
scheme did not do what the current scheme did. Implicit in this
reasoning is the assumption that the purpose of the current scheme
was to do exactly what it did: enforce a uniform day of rest for retail
employees and firms with fewer than 8 employees and fewer than
5,000 sq. ft. By choosing to define the provision's purpose in
tautological terms the Court ensured a perfect fit between means
and ends, and effectively ruled out the possibility of any alternative
scheme fitting the purpose. Manipulation of the characterization of
legislative purpose was used in Edwards to justify upholding the
157 ibid. at 24.
158 Ibid. at 20-21.
159 Ibid. at 23.
160 As we will see, infra, this was the ultimate characterization of purpose.
161 Ibid. at 48.
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relevant legislation under Section 1; it can just as easily be used to
justify not upholding legislation under Section 1.162
162 In Regina v. Oakay, supra, note 101, the Court refused to uphold under section I a
provision of the Narcotics Control Act requiring that a person found in possession of any
quantity of marijuana establish at trial, on pain of conviction for trafficking, that he or she
did not intend to sell marijuana. According to the Court the provision violated the Charter's
guarantee of the presumption of innocence by shifting the burden of proof of intent to traffic
from the Crown to the accused, and because there was no "rational connection" between the
provision and the purpose of the legislation, the violation was not justified under section 1.
In characterizing the purpose of the legislative provision in question, the Court chose not to
follow the Crown's formulation. The Crown had argued that the purpose of the provision was
"curbing drug trafficking by facilitating the conviction of drug traffickers." Ibid. at 228. When
the Court formulated the purpose, however, it dropped the second clause. According to it,
the provision's purpose was to "[protect] our society from the grave ills associated with drug
trafficking." Ibid. at 229. Thus, under the Court's formulation, the reverse onus provision
had to fit the purpose of "curbing drug trafficking." Under the Crown's formulation, on the
other hand, the reverse onus provision would have had to fit the purpose of "curbing drug
trafficking" by facilitating the conviction of drug traffickers.
The gist of the Court's argument was that the reverse onus provision was not
rationally connected to the purpose of curbing drug trafficking because its operation could
lead to convictions for drug trafficking of people who were in possession of narcotics but had
no intention to sell them. A person could be accused of possession, and then, unable to
demonstrate she had no intention to traffic, she would be convicted of trafficking when, in
fact, she had no intention to traffic. The provision was, according to the court, "overinclusive
and could lead to results in certain cases which would defy both rationality and fairness."
Ibid. at 229. The Court emphasized that the aim of "curbing drug trafficking" was not served
by punishing non-drug traffickers for drug trafficking. Accordingly, the reverse onus provision
was not, in the Court's view, rationally related to curbing drug trafficking. The Court's logic
cannot, however, account for the effectiveness of the reverse onus provisions in pursuing the
purpose of the provision as formulated by the Crown: namely, curbing drug trafficking by
"facilitating the conviction of drug traffickers." Whatever might have been the effect of the
provision on non-drug traffickers, there was a strong argument in favour of its effectiveness
in making the conviction of people who did intend to traffic easier. Reverse onus provisions
relieve the Crown of having to prove a difficult element of the offence and thereby make it
quicker, easier and cheaper for it to secure a conviction. See Sheldrick, "Shifting Burdens
and Required Inferences: The Constitutionality of Reverse Onus Clauses" (1986) 44 U.T. Fac.
L Rev. 179 at 202-03. That the provision caught non-traffickers as well as traffickers - the
gist of the Court's argument - begs the question of whether or not it made it easier to convict
traffickers. If you want to catch more big fish, you widen your nets, even though this might
entail catching more little fish as well. The Court did not meet this argument. In defining
the purpose of the provision as it did, the Court had severed the connection between "curbing
drug trafficking' and "facilitating conviction." Thus it did not consider the relationship
between the provision and "curbing drug trafficking" with reference to the effect of the
provision on facilitating "the conviction of drug traffickers." It concentrated, instead, on how
the provision operated in the individual case, arguing, as we saw above, that convicting a
particular individual of trafficking when she was not a trafficker, was not rationally related to
curbing drug trafficking. See P. Monahan & A. Petter, supra, note 144 at 102-25.
Constitutional Legitimacy
III.
Our analysis of constitutional argument in Charter decisions
has, to this point, concentrated on examples where the Court, or
commentators, have argued for the legitimacy of judicial review on
the ground that constitutional decisions are determined by the
provisions of the constitution and the purposes supposedly underlying
them. I would now like to return to the second type of legitimation
argument identified at the outset of this essay, and manifest in the
early writings of Bora Laskin : namely, "trust" in judicial policy-
making. Trust-based arguments reject the possibility of
constitutionally determined answers to questions that arise in
constitutional adjudication. They accept judicial policy making as
a necessary, and desirable, aspect of constitutional adjudication and
do not pretend the constitution constrains judicial choice and
discretion. The role of the judge is to articulate the competing
interests involved in a constitutional dispute, to balance these against
one another, and then decide which interest ought to prevail, by
impartially and reasonably evaluating the potential consequences of
deciding one way or the other. The legitimacy of judicial review
within this approach is grounded, as we have seen, in trust in, rather
than denial of, judicial choice 63 This type of analysis is illustrated
by the majority decisions in R. v. Jones 64 and Dolphin Delivery.16s
163 For a contrast of "ad hoe balancing" and "per se rules" techniques in American
constitutional law, see Note, "Civil Liabilities and the First Amendement" (1969) 78 Yale LJ.
842. See also: Frantz, 'The First Amendment in the Balance" (1962) 71 Yale L. 1424;
Mendelson, "On the Meaning of the First Amendment: Absolutes in the Balance" (1962) 50
Cal. L. Rev. 821; and Tushnet, "Anti-Formalism in Recent Constitutional Theory" (1985) 83
Mich. L. Rev. 1502. See also Michelman, "Forward: Traces of Self-Government" (1986) 100
Harv. L. Rev. 4. Michelman argues that balancing is preferable to the "generality of ...
formulas, ideally abstracted from all divisive contingencies of actual social life." Ibid. at 30.
It escapes the "comforts of legal abstraction." Ibid. at 33. The balancing technique is
desirable because of its openness, its particularity, and its not attempting to colonize the future
by establishing fixed rules. Ibid. at 34. It commits the judge to practical reason and affirms
rather than denies the judge's responsibility for decision making. Ibid. at 35. See also: Lyon,
"The Teleological Mandate of the Fundamental Freedoms Guarantee: What to Do With
Vague But Meaningful Generalities" (1982) 4 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 57 at 58, 69, 72, 73; and D.
Kennedy, "Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication" supra, note 1.
164 R. v. Jones, supra, note 150.
165 Supra, note 2.
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In each of these, the majority proceeded by articulating the
particular interests of the individual and government at stake in the
dispute, and determining the outcome on the basis of which interest
was weightier.
In Jones the Court upheld a legislative provision requiring
parents to send their children to public school unless they obtained
a certificate from the education authorities certifying that their
children were receiving sufficient education at home or elsewhere.
The accused educated his children, along with a number of other
children, in the basement of a fundamentalist church of which he
was the pastor. He alleged that the Act violated his religious
freedom as guaranteed by the Charter. By requiring him to apply to
a secular school board for certification, he argued, the Act compelled
him to acknowledge that his authority over his children, and his duty
to attend to their education, came from the state and not from God.
The majority dismissed the appeal. In its reasons for decision, it did
not even pay lip service to the purposive approach. It made no
attempt to ascertain the principles and values the guarantee of
freedom of religion was meant to serve, nor did it rely on its earlier
elaboration of these in R. v. Big M. Rather, the majority
concentrated on articulating the interest of the applicant which had
been impaired by the legislation and the degree of its impairment.
It concluded that the Act "constitute[d] some interference with the
appellant's freedom of religion," since the appellant had "an interest
in, and a religious conviction that he must himself provide for the
education of his children."166 However, the majority considered the
degree of the infringement of the appellant's religious freedom to be
"minimal" and "peripheral."167
Having defined the appellant's interest and the degree of its
impairment the court turned to the competing interest of the state
"in the education of its citizens."1'6 This interest, in contrast to the
"minimal" and "peripheral" interest of the individual, was considered
166 Supra, note 101 at 251.
167 Ibid. at 255. "Such a requirement constitutes a minimal, or as the trial judge put it,
peripheral intrusion on religion."
168 Ibid. at 252.
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by the majority to be "compelling. 169 The legislature should have,
according to the majority, "without further demonstration,"170 been
able to impose reasonable limits on the appellant's interest in
advancing the state's interest in education: "Section 1 of the Charter
allows for this."1 71 The majority easily reached the conclusion that
the state's interest in education outweighed the appellant's interest
in freedom of religion. In reaching this conclusion, the majority was
not at all concerned with whether there was a sufficient fit between
the object of the legislation and the measure in question. Indeed,
it entirely ignored the steps in the Oakes proportionality test and
proceeded by simply "weigh[ing] the competing interests"1 72 of the
individual and the government against the general standards of
"reasonableness" and "demonstrable justification" articulated in
Section 1.
The contrast between the balancing type of argument used
by the majority in Jones and the approach used by members of the
Court in the cases discussed in Part II is vividly illustrated by
comparing the reasons of the majority to Wilson J.'s dissent. Wilson
J. affirmed the two basic tenets of the standard constraint-based
Charter argument. First, she insisted that it was necessary to give
content to freedom of religion through purposive analysis. She
pointed out that the "core" of freedom of religion had been defined
by the Court in Big M and included, at a minimum, "the right to
manifest religious belief ... by teaching and dissemination."173 The
purpose of freedom of religion was, however, limited to protecting
individuals only from substantial interference with their religious
freedom and, therefore, it did not protect the appellant in the
present case. Secondly, Wilson J. reasserted the need to apply
section 1 on the basis of the regime established in Oakes. As a
reminder to a majority which appeared to have forgotten about
Oakes, Wilson J. noted that: "[t]here has to be a form of
169 Iid. at 253.
170 Ibid.
171 Ibid.
172 Ibid. at 254.
173 Ibid. at 269.
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proportionality between the means employed and the end sought to
be achieved. 174
A "balancing" approach was again used by a majority of the
Court in Dolphin Delivery. In that case the majority determined that
the Charter's guarantee of freedom of expression did not protect
secondary picketing - picketing by employees of a business which did
business with the employer but was not directly involved in the
labour dispute between the employer and employees - from a court
ordered injunction.!75 As in Jones, the majority was more concerned
with weighing competing interests than defining the purpose of
freedom of expression and then applying it to the facts. It was
content to say that "[tihere is ... always some element of expression
in picketing" and that "the picketing sought to be restrained would
have involved the exercise of the right of freedom of expression."176
The competing interests in favour of curbing freedom of expression
in this case were, according to the majority, "pressing and
substantial."177 Again, as in Jones the majority did not apply the
means/end proportionality test that had been established in Oakes.
Rather, it simply noted that "[a] balance between the two competing
concerns must be found."178  The majority concluded that the
public's interest in being protected from the adverse effects of
picketing outweighed the union's interest in free expression.
Accordingly, it held the injunction should be sustained under section
1.179 Again, Wilson J. was bothered by the way the majority had
174 Ibid. at 274.
175 The Court decided the case on the basis of s.32 and pointed out that it was not
necessary to deal with Sections 2 and 1. Nonetheless, the Court did deal with these sections,
possibly to indicate it would have decided against the union even if the union had won on s.
32.
176 Supra, note 2.
177 Ibid. at 188.
178 Ibid. at 189.
179 The Court was clear that it had departed from the proportionality test. After
describing the balancing process, the Court stated that the requirement of proportionality was
also met. Ibid. at 190. It did not, however, make any serious attempt to argue why the test
was met.
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proceeded in its section 1 inquiry. She was concerned that "no
objective criteria for the s.1 inquiry [had] been identified."180
When courts engage in open balancing of interests, and
abandon constraint-based reasoning, they rely implicitly on trust, as
a basis of legitimacy for their decisions. I want to suggest, however,
that as a formal ground for the legitimacy of judicial review trust is
at least as problematic as the constraint-based arguments examined
earlier. There is little reason to trust judges' determinations of what
are reasonable or fair solutions to controversial and vexing political
issues in society. Indeed, there is much to support considerable
distrust. As Peter Hogg has pointed out:
[IThe judiciary's] background is not broadly representative of the population: they
are recruited exclusively from the small class of successful, middle-aged lawyers; they
do not necessarily have much knowledge of or expertise in public affairs, and after
appointment they are expected to remain aloof from most public issues.181
Judges operate at or near the centres of social, economic and
political power in society, and within an institutional framework
committed to preserving and perpetuating the social and economic
order as it exists.18 2  The perspective judges bring to decision-
making - no matter how neutral and impartial they attempt to be -
will be shaped by the social grouping they are a part of and the
enterprise they are engaged in. As members of an elite class
engaged in a fundamentally conservative enterprise, their perspective
will be radically different than that of other, and particularly non-
elite classes in society.183
180 Ibid. at 200.
181 Supra, note 87 at 98.
182 J.A.G. Griffiths, The Politics of the Judiciary (Glasgow: Fontana Press, 1981); R.
Miliband, The State hi Capitalist Society (London: Quartet Books, 1973); and A. Petter, supra,
note 144.
183 The "legal perspective," i.e., that of judges and other members of the legal elite, is
the perspective of the ruling classes in society and interprets the world, for the most part, in
terms of the interests of those classes. The experience of oppression by those who are not
members of the ruling classes - for reasons of gender, race, class, sexual orientation, or other
characteristics that differentiate them from these classes - are not part of this perspective:
their history, custom, traditions do not count within in. Accordingly, the elite perspective
encoded in the world view of judges lends to an impoverished understanding of domination
and oppression at best, and, at worst, a denial that it exists and its further entrenchment.
Some of the readings I have found helpful in exploring these ideas are (and this list is far
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Because of their personal attributes and institutional ethos,
judges can be relied upon to interpret social phenomena and legal
materials from the standpoint of the dominant groups in society with
whom their professional discipline has historically been allied. In
this sense, the judiciary is presumptively partial. Martha Minow has
argued that the natural tendency of the courts will be to reinforce
"dominant cultural forms," the illusion of one reality 8 4, taking at face
value ideas like "individual choice and community consensus:"185 "...
if we seek to be understood, let alone to succeed, in a court of law,
we must fit our claims into existing doctrine, even if that doctrine
uses white middle class men as its reference point., 186 In short, the
dominant perspective assumes "the idea that critical features of the
status quo - general social and economic arrangements - are
desirable."187  Similarly, Paul Brest has noted judges are part of the
"dominant national alliance," an alliance representing the interests of
elites, and, for that reason, 'judges' attitudes on important social and
political issues do not reflect those of the population at large."188
While I do not doubt the sincerity of judges who endeavour to rise
above partisanship, nor the possibility of occasional progressive
decisions, it would be unrealistic to expect judges to "be independent
from exhaustive): Scheingold, The Politics of Rights (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974);
Bell Hooks, Feminist Theory (Boston: South End Press, 1984); C. Sumner, Reading Ideologies,
supra, note 130; J.A.G. Griffiths, The Politics of the Judiciary, ibid. Bell, And We Are Not
Saved (New York: Basic Books, 1987); Freeman, "Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review"
in Kairys, ed., The Politics of Law (New York: Pantheon Books, 1982); R. Miliband, ibid.; J.
Fudge, "Labour, the Constitution and Old Style Liberalism" (1988) 13(2) Queen's L.J. 61;
Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed (New York: Continuum, 1970); M. Kline, "Race, Racism
and Feminist Legal Theory" [forthcoming, Harv. Women's L.J.]; Hutchinson, Dwelling on te
Threshold (Toronto: Carswell, 1988); A. Hunt, 'The Critique of Law: What is 'Critical' about
Critical Legal Theory" (1987) 14 J. of L. and Soc. 5; M. Mandel, "Dworkin, Hart and the
Problem of Theoretical Perspective" (1979) 14 L. and Soc. Rev. 57; S. Martin & K. Mahoney,
supra, note 130; P. Monture, "Ka-Nin-Geh-Heh-Gah-E-Sa-Nonh-Yah-Gah" (1986) 2 Can. J.
Women L. 159; Minow, "Forward: Justice Engendered" (1986) Harv. L. Rev. 10; and P. Brest,
"Interpretation and Interest" (1982) 34 Stan. L. Rev. 765.
1 8 4 Ibid. at 69.
185 Ibid. at 68.
186 Ibid. at 65.
187 Ibid. at 54.
188 p. Brest, "Who Decides?" (1985) 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. 661 at 669.
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of the multitude of influences, notably of class origin, education,
class situation and professional tendency, which contribute as much
to the formation of their view of the world as they do in the case
of other men."189 One does not easily step outside of, nor transcend
such influences. Beliefs are not chosen, they are held: "... the
interpreter is embedded in a structure of beliefs of which his
judgments are an extension.'"190
Thus, it is unclear why we should trust, and privilege over
any other, the value judgements of an elite group of predominantly
white, upper middle class, male lawyers.1 91 Why, for example, should
we trust the majority of the Court in Dolphin Delivery1 92 to balance
the free expression involved in picketing against the "public interest?"
In that case, the majority took a traditional and narrow perspective
on industrial conflict, arguing that the fundamental tenet of
collective bargaining was the idea that "parties themselves should,
wherever possible, work out their own agreement;"1 93 and that
"industrial conflict may be tolerated by society but only as an
inevitable corollary of the collective bargaining process."
1 94
Therefore, little weight was attached to secondary picketing, which,
by definition, extends beyond the dispute between primary parties.
From other perspectives, for example, that of the labour movement,
however, secondary picketing might appear very weighty - or at least
weighty enough to outweigh the "public's interest" in containing
picketing.195
Indeed, the majority's assumption that there was a conflict
between secondary picketing and the public interest itself reveals the
partiality of its perspective. One could argue plausibly, for example,
that the public has a strong interest in having powerful and effective
189 R. Miliband, supra, note 182 at 124.
190 S. Fish, "Wrong Again" (1983) 62 Tex. L. Rev. 299 at 312.
191 Supra, notes 182, 183 and 188.
192 Supra, note 2.
193 Ibid. at 189.
194 Ibid.
195 For a general discussion of secondary picketting, see D. Beatty, "Secondary Boycotts:
A Functional Analysis" (1974) 52 Can. Bar Rev. 388.
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labour unions. The majority of the "public" are, after all, workers,
not owners and managers, and unions provide benefits to and
protection of workers that would be unavailable to them without the
representation, or at least the presence, of strong and effective
unions. Defining "public interest" as including strong and effective
unions would inevitably put a different spin on the question of
whether enjoining secondary picketing served or impaired the public
interest. Allowing secondary picketing as a means of empowering
unions might then be portrayed as serving, rather than impairing, the
public interest.
The example demonstrates that the majority of the Court
has a particular point of view on labour relations - one that is
neither empathetic nor sympathetic to the interests of organized
labour. Obviously, judges have points of view on most of the issues
they must decide. As Petter points out, however, "there would be
less reason for concern on this score if the courts had an equal
understanding of, and empathy for, the problems of all segments of
Canadian society." The difficulty is that, because of the composition
and institutional role of the courts, such empathy is lacking. And
the absence of empathy undermines the argument that decisions of
the courts under the Charter are legitimate because of the
trustworthiness of judges. Trust in an institution is normally based on
the institution's capacity to empathize with the person or group
doing the trusting. It is, therefore, a weak ground for legitimating
the outcomes of constitutional adjudication.
The argument is often made that explicit interest-balancing
is preferable to more legalistic forms of decision-making in spite of
the difficulties discussed above. Open interest balancing, it is
argued, allows for a more honest and open adjudicative process and
leads to decisions more in tune with social and economic reality.19 6
With respect to the first of these, it is important to understand that
interest balancing can be just as obfuscating as more "legalistic"
forms of decision-making. Before two interests can be weighed, they
must be characterized. The particular characterization of an interest
is usually portrayed as self-evident and uncontroversial. Yet,
196 F. Cohen, 'Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach" (1935) 35 Col.
L Rev. 809 at 820-22 and 838-42; Laskin, supra, notes 30 and 31; Lederman, supra, note 71;
and Michelman, supra, note 163.
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competing interests can be made to look more or less important in
relation to one other depending on how the Court defines their
respective levels of generality. 97  One interest can be portrayed as
"highly generalized and obviously crucial," while the other is cast as
a "rather particular and narrowly conceived claim."198 Thus, even
before the interests are weighted and balanced against one another
the Court can create a strong inertia towards one interest or the
other.
In Jones,199 for example, the court articulated the respective
interests of the complainant and the government at radically
different levels of generality. The government's interest was
articulated as the "efficient education of the young."200  The
complainant's interest was stated as a desire on his part to refrain
from acknowledging "that the government, rather than God, [had]
the final authority over the education of his children."20 1  In other
words, the government's interest was articulated as education in
general, rather than the enforcement of a particular policy within the
education system, while the individual's interest was deemed a
particular aspect of freedom of religion rather than freedom of
religion in general. The level of generality at which one interest was
articulated was exactly the opposite of the level of generality at
which the other was articulated. The government's interest was
portrayed as "highly generalized and obviously crucial," while the
individual's was cast as a "rather particular and narrowly conceived
claim." It was thus made easier for the Court to find that the
government's interest outweighed that of Mr. Jones.
2 02
197 C. Fried, 'Two Concepts of Interests: Some Reflections on the Supreme Courts
Balancing Test" (1963) 76 Harv. L. Rev. 755.
198 Ibid. at 763.
199 Supra, note 164.
200 Ibid. at 255.
201 Ibid. at 250.
202 The importance of how the competing interests are articulated is illustrated by
flipping the relative levels of generality and particularity of the government's and the
individual's interests in Jones. Suppose the Court had characterized the government's interest
as a particular aspect of its more general interest in education: namely, its interest in ensuring
that the applicant (and possibly others similarly situated) complied with the requirement of
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The second argument in favour of explicit interest balancing
is that it ensures a decision in tune with social and economic
circumstances by enabling the judge to take account of all the
relevant facts and interests raised by a particular constitutional
dispute. The difficulty with this argument is that it just will not be
possible for the court to base its decision on a complete picture of
the factual context and all the interests at stake. These will extend
far beyond the restricted setting of the case to factors beyond the
court's comprehension and imagination.203  The problem is made
visible by just scratching the surface of the Court's reasons in
Dolphin Deliveiy. Even if we accept the Court's understanding of
the public interest, it does not follow, as the Court believed it did,
that protecting the power of courts to issue labour injunctions in
cases of secondary picketing would promote "industrial peace." One
could argue, for example, that the use of labour injunctions to enjoin
picketing has the effect of exacerbating tensions between labour and
management, prolonging strikes, inciting violence, et cetera. Labour
injunctions are not happily accepted by unions, and their use,
whether in primary or secondary picketing, might do more harm to
the prospect of industrial peace than good.2 °4 In short, there is little
reason to assume along with the Court that upholding the power of
courts to issue labour injunctions to enjoin secondary picketing
would promote, rather than detract from, the public's interest in
labour peace.
applying for a certificate to educate his children outside the public schools. And, suppose the
Court had characterized the appellant's interest in general terms: namely, his interest in
freedom of religion. Now, the government's "particular and narrowly conceived claim" in a
minor and limited exception to its policy of requiring applications for certificates would have
to be balanced against the appellant's "highly generalized and obviously crucial" interest in
freedom of religion. The tilt would now be in the opposite direction. The scales would be
weighed in favour of the appellant.
203 See Tushnet, supra, note 163.
204 The enforcement of labour injunctions, whether judicially or legislatively mandated,
is, of course, carried out by the police. Injunctions, thus, have the effect of turning peaceful
demonstrating and picketing into violent confrontations between police and workers. See S.
Fine & R. Millar eds, Policing the Miners' Strike (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1985).
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IV.
The above analyses support conclusions that judges make
controversial policy decisions in constitutional adjudication and that
there are no good reasons for us to trust them in doing so. The
two formal grounds for the legitimacy of judicial review, truth and
trust, do not hold up upon close scrutiny. It is now necessary to
deal with a further type of legitimation argument that might be said
to follow from the critiques of the other two. I will call this the
restraint argument. This type of argument accepts as a matter of
fact that judges make policy decisions in constitutional adjudication,
and prescribes on this basis that they defer to the legislature which
is democratically accountable and, therefore, more deserving of trust,
as well as more constrained (by the ballot box), than the judiciary.
Obviously, it can only be used to justify decisions upholding
legislation. Numerous variations on this argument have been
advanced by commentators, 205 and it has provided the Court with a
convenient justification for upholding legislation in a number of
instances.
In theAlberta Reference,206 for example, the majority opinions
of LeDain J. and McIntyre J. emphasized that labour relations was
a "field" "involving a balance of competing interests"20 7 that was
"delicate," "dynamic and unstable," and upon which "the public at
large depend[ed] for its security and welfare."208  The balancing of
interests in this area should have, in their view, been left to the
"freely elected legislature and to parliament."2°9 Constitutionalizing
the right to strike, and therefore prohibiting legislation banning
205 Hogg, supra, note 87 at 99; G.V. LaForest, 'The Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms: An Overview" (1983) 61 Can. Bar Rev. 19 at 25-26; S. Fairley, "Enforcing the
Charter. Some Thoughts on an Appropriate and Just Standard for Judicial Review" (1982) 4
Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 217 at 231-54; M. Gold, supra, note 94; and R.A. MacDonald, "Postscript
and Prelude - The Jurisprudence of the Charter- Eight Theses" (1982) 4 Sup. Ct L. Rev. 321
at 346; Also, see infra, notes 227, 230 and 231 and accompanying text.
2 0 6 Supra, note 96.
207 1bid. at 240.
208 Ibid. at 233.
209 Ibid. at 237.
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strikes, would have involved the Court in substituting its judgement
for that of the legislature.210 Similarly, in R. v. Edwards Books and
Art,211 Dickson C.J.C., writing for the majority, characterized the
question of deciding who was exempt from a general Sunday closing
requirement as one involving "balancing ... an indirect burden on the
religious freedom of a retail store owner against the interests of his
or her perhaps sometimes numerous employees. 212  He insisted,
however, that the Court could not question the balance struck by
the legislature because the issue of where the line was to be drawn
between the competing interests involved was discretionary.213 The
Court was unwilling "to substitute judicial opinion for legislative ones
as to the place at which to draw a precise line."214  LaForest J.
emphasized in a concurring opinion that the area of Sunday closing
was one involving the operation of "sociological and economic
forces"215 and "many competing pressures, 216 involving "choices the
Court is not in a position to make. 217
The difficulty with the restraint type of argument is this:
nobody is willing to claim that the courts should defer to legislative
judgement in all cases, but there is no uncontroversial way to draw
a line between those cases where deference is appropriate and those
where it is not. The very question of deciding whether an area is
"political," and therefore one which calls for judicial restraint, is
political.21 8  As one commentator has observed: "Self-restraint is
210 Ibid.
211 Supra, note 125.
212 Ibid. at 47.
213 Ibid. at 49.
214 Ibid. at 51.
215 Ibid. at 68.
216 Ibid. at 67.
217 Ibid. at 68.
218 S. Wright, supra, note 115:
Unfortunately, judicial activism and judicial restraint are terms whose meanings
metamorphosize with each commentator. "Activism" to the Warren Court critics
was everything that they deplored in judges, whereas "restraint" to the new judicial
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easily turned on or off."219  Why is it that labour relations
220
provincial Sunday closing legislation, 221 criminal procedure222 and
language rights223 are too political for the Court to touch, while anti-
combines legislation,224  abortion225  and the testing of cruise
missiles 226 are within the purview of judicial scrutiny? Commentators
are no more consistent in their calls for restraint than is the Court.
Paul Weiler has argued that division of powers issues are "political"
and therefore require a deferential posture on the part of the Court,
while at the same time arguing that it is proper for the Court to
take an activist stance under the Charter.227  Patrick Monahan, on
right is synonymous with principled decision making.
Ibid. at 489.
Once we acknowledge that the Constitution appropriately constrains the choices of
the representative branches of government in some cases, we can no longer maintain
that the sheer number of times that the courts rule legislative enactments
unconstitutional says much about whether the courts are doing their job right. The
criticism has got to be that the courts are overruling majoritarian choices in the
wrong situations rather than simply too often. But this criticism demands some
criteria for determining the "right" situations for invalidating majoritarian choices
other than, for example, a rule like "no more frequently than once a year."
Ibid. at 491. See also: Fudge, supra, note 183 at 75; F. Rodell, Nine Men: A Political History
of the Supreme Court from 1790-1955 (New York: Random House, 1955) at 19-20; and
Michelman, supra, note 163.
219 G. Braden, 'qhe Search for Objectivity in Constitutional Law" (1947-1948) 57 Yale
L.J. 571.
2 2 0 Alberta Reference, supra, note 96.
221 Big M, supra, note 101 and Edwards, supra, note 125.
222 R. v. Mills, supra, note 96.
223 Societe DesAcadiens Du Nouveau-Brunswick Inc. v. Association of Parents for Fairness
in Education, supra, note 76.
224 Hunter v. Southam, supra, note 96.
225 R v. Morgentaler, supra, note 96.
226 Operation Dismantle, supra, note 108.
2 2 7 p. Weiler, "Rights and Judges in a Democracy: A New Canadian Version" (1984) 18
U. of Mich. . of L. Rev. 51.
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the other hand, understands federalism adjudication as relatively
devoid of political content, while emphasizing that, in Charter cases,
"The Court ... is a political actor, making political choices between
competing social values,"228 and, accordingly, should develop
"techniques of judicial deference precisely so they might avoid being
faced with ... essentially legislative determinations. 229 The basis of
these claims, and the claims by the Court looked at above, is that
judges, can be "activist" in some areas, while they must be
"restrained" in others. Yet, there is no apparent constraint on, nor
reason to trust, judges, or commentators, in characterizing a
particular area one way or the other.
A second difficulty with the restraint argument is that it
presumes priority should be given to the democratic process over all
other values. The value of a given substantive judicial outcome
requiring striking down a governmental action is automatically given
less weight than the value of preserving the democratic process.
Restraint as a prescriptive "theory of judicial review" forces its
adherents to laud decisions where the Court upholds legislation they
(the adherents) find objectionable on substantive grounds, while
condemning decisions striking down such legislation. For example,
a person advocating restraint would have to condemn Morgentaler
and laud the Alberta Reference on the grounds that the former
manifest judicial interference with the democratic process, and the
latter judicial deference to that process. Thus, she would have to
attribute more weight to the democratic process than to the
desirability of any of the possible substantive results in the cases. In
this sense, she would be choosing a balance between competing
values with the democratic process winning out over all others.
When judges invoke the restraint argument they make the same
choice. And it is a choice reflecting political preference.
Defenders of judicial deference to the legislature often argue
that expanded judicial power detracts from, rather than advances,
human rights and freedoms. This argument rejects the notion that
judges should be relied on to protect rights and freedoms as a
distortion and misconception in the modern welfare state. According
228 Supra, note 144 at 77.
229 Supra, note 117 at 98.
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to Monahan and Petter: "Where there has been progress towards
[social justice] ... the impetus has, with few exceptions, come in the
democratic rather than the judicial arena."230 Furthermore, they and
others point to the historical predilections of the courts against the
interests of the disempowered. As empirical observations, their
points are unassailable. Historically courts have upheld traditional
structures of power and domination and, institutionally, they are
limited in their capacity to challenge seriously substantive inequality.
There are, in other words, good grounds for scepticism about the
potential of the Charter to usher in a new era of social justice, and
to fear its potential for ushering out existing and hard fought for
protections of the interests of ordinary people. And, as argued in
Part III, we should be sceptical about the claim that the courts can
be trusted to make important policy decisions. While these insights
are crucial considerations in forming political and litigation strategies
around the Charter and assessing legitimation arguments concerning
judicial review, however, they do not support restraint based
arguments as a formal ground of legitimacy. It does not follow that,
because courts are unlikely to render progressive decisions under the
Charter, they act illegitimately when, and if, they do.231  A
230 Monahan & Petter, supra, note 144 at 124.
231 The view that courts should defer to "economic" legislation in constitutional
adjudication, for example, originally developed in response to the pro-business anti-regulatory
activity of the Courts under the U.S. Bill of Rights (the Lochner era). The restraint argument
was thus linked to the substantive politics of particular decisions. That link is, however,
absent in much of the restraint rhetoric we find today. The restraint argument is used to
legitimate decisions to defer to legislation that is "economic" in form, regardless of its
substance. Monahan and Petter, for example, appear to be in favour of deference to
"economic" legislation. See ibid. at 121-22. Monahan argues that the Court should not
intervene in the economy to provide "minimum levels of income, housing and education."
Such interference would, in his view, be undesirable because of the historical record of the
court in blocking social welfare measures. Monahan's argument appears, however, to derive
an "ought" from an "is:' He is accurate in his description of the historical record, but it is not
clear how that description supports a prescription that the Court continue in that mode. See
Monahan, supra, note 117 at 126-27. Perhaps the best illustration of the formalization of
restraint arguments is Dandidge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). In that case, the United
States Supreme Court refused to strike down a legislative provision for a "maximum grant" of
$250 per month per family regardless of family size under the equal protection clause. The
applicants claimed that the provision resulted in disparity of grants of welfare payments to
large families. The Court stated:
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normative prescription of restraint as the only legitimate judicial
action under the Charter cannot be derived from a set of empirical
observations about the court's historical tendencies.
A third difficulty with the restraint argument is its premise
that current "democratic" institutions are democratic. Advocating
deference to these institutions in the name of democracy implies
they are democratic. This is itself a controversial and value-laden
judgement. People disagree on the extent the democratic ideal of
accountability must be manifest in the actual practices of a political
system before the system deserves to be called democratic. Many
argue that, because of the unequal structuring of wealth and power
in the economies in which "democratic" institutions operate the idea
of accountability is little more than a source for rhetorical posturing.
The Canadian electoral process, like that of most Western states,
requires money, and lots of it, to support candidates, organize
pressure groups, campaign, advertise, et cetera. Those individuals
and groups with more money are therefore in a better position to
determine, who, and what issues, run for election, as well as to
provide support for effective campaigning, than those with less.
They may also resort to forms of support other than direct
contributions to political parties, as evidenced by the advertising
campaign supporting the Mulroney trade deal in the 1988 federal
election. In short, the "political market" of electoral politics
For this Court to approve the invalidation of state economic or social regulation
as "overreaching" would be far too reminiscent of an era when the court thought
the 14th Amendment gave it power to strike down state laws "because they may be
unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought." That
era long ago passed into history. In the area of economics and social welfare, a
State does not violate [equal protection] merely because the classifications made by
its laws are imperfect.... To be sure, [the cases] enunciating this fundamental
standard under [equal protection] have in the main involved state regulation of
business or industry. The administration of public welfare assistance, by contrast
involves the most basic economic needs of impoverished human beings. We
recognize the dramatically real factual difference between the cited cases and this
one, but we can find no basis for applying a different constitutional standard....
[T]he 14th Amendment gives the federal courts no power to impose upon the States
their views of what constitutes wise economic or social policy.... [The] intractable
economic, social, and even philosophical problems presented by public welfare
assistance programs are not the business of this Court.
]bid. at 484-87.
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functions like other markets in allowing those who have more to get
more.
Furthermore, there is the real danger that a party in power
will primarily serve the interests of the powerful and organized
groups who supported its bid for election: a "tyranny of the
minority." If the bulk of the government's power is used to serve a
small constituency of powerful supporters, the interests of the
majority of people will be ignored and/or sacrificed.232 Those who
argue for restraint often assume, despite all of these difficulties, that
current institutional arrangements are democratic. Indeed, they
suggest judicial review is undemocratic, even if directed at securing
social and economic equality for the purpose of making democracy
more substantively democratic.2 33 Once again, counselling judicial
restraint under the constitution is wise strategy (for all the reasons
discussed earlier) if one wishes to protect governmental support of
disadvantaged and oppressed groups. Prescribing judicial restraint in
the name of democratic accountability, however, assumes
unquestioningly that there is democratic accountability. This
assumption is certainly not shared by all and, therefore, cannot
provide an uncontroversial basis of legitimacy for judicial restraint in
constitutional cases.
V.
In the second part of this paper I challenged the view that
the outcomes of constitutional adjudication were determined by the
constitution. I argued that the constitutional text, and the purposes
and principles supposedly informing it, could not be relied upon to
constrain judicial choice and discretion. They were insufficiently
precise to direct interpreters to uniquely correct answers to
constitutional questions. A number of contemporary legal
232 See C.B. MacPherson, The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy (Oxford and New
York: Oxford University Press, 1977) at 87-88; W.R. Neumann, The Paradox of Mass Politics:
Knowledge and Opinion in the American Electorate (London, England and Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1986); and R. Parker, 'The Past of Constitutional Theory - And Its
Future' (1981) 42 Ohio LJ. 223 at 242-43.
233 See, for an example of such an argument, P. Monahan, supra, note 117 at 126-27.
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theorists234 have rejected this type of "indeterminacy" critique2 35 on
the ground it wrongly assumes objectivity and constraint cannot be
achieved in the absence of logical determinacy. Such determinacy
may be a formalist's dream, they point out, but notwithstanding its
implausibility constitutional interpretation can still be an objective
and constrained process. I will call this type of argument the weak
constraint thesis to distinguish it from the strong constraint thesis
(logical determinacy) examined in Part II. As we will see, the weak
constraint thesis attempts to establish a middle ground between the
view that judges are mere agents of constitutional truths, and the
opposing view that judges decide cases on the basis of which result
they consider to advance a better policy. In doing so it relies on
themes of both constraint and trust.
Writers who argue for the weak constraint thesis usually
make three basic points. First, they concede that law is logically
indeterminate; that there is often no uncontroversial link between a
legal prescription and a judicial result. Rather, they argue, law is a
matter of interpretation and interpretation "necessarily entail[s]
strong personal elements. 236  Thus, it is inevitable that different
interpreters will reach different interpretations of the same legal
234 J. Williams, "Critical Legal Studies: The Death of Transcendence and the Rise of
the New Langdells" (1987) 62 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 429; J. Stick, "Can Nihilism Be Pragmatic"
(1986) 100 Harv. L. Rev. 332; 0. Fiss, "Objectivity and Interpretation" (1981-82) 34 Stan. L.
Rev. 739; B. Langille, "Revolution Without Foundation: The Grammar of Scepticism and
Law" (1988) 33 McGill LJ. 451; and R. Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge: Belknap Press,
1986). For applications of Dworkin's "interpretive" methodology to constitutional theory, see
D. Beatty, supra, note 117; P. Monahan, ibid.; and R. Fallon, "A Constructivist Coherence
Theory of Constitutional Interpretation" (1987) 52 Harv. L. Rev. 1189.
235 See text at 154-68.
236 0. Fiss, supra, note 234.
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materials. 237  The interpretation reached by an individual will, at
least to some extent, reflect her moral and political convictions.
2 3 8
Second, these writers argue that despite all of this,
adjudication is objective, constrained and rational. They point out
that judges generally internalize, and experience as constraining, a
set of values, attitudes, conventions and procedures. These are, to
quote Brian Langille, the "structural conditions" or "social rules" or
"rules of the game" accepted by judges as a group;239 Owen Fiss
calls them "disciplining rules" and finds their source in the
"interpretive community" of judges;240  and Ronald Dworkin speaks
of the judge's "interpretive attitude" - her internalization of a duty
to reach legal decisions on the basis of principle rather than desired
outcomes.241  In short, the weak constraint theorists argue that
judges approach their task with an attitude that enables them to
237 See, for example, R. Dworkin, supra, note 234: 'The interpreter's understanding of
what is the purpose of the practice, and what is necessary to achieve it, will ultimately be
informed by his personal and subjective views." Ibid. at 256. "If the raw data do not
discriminate between ... competing interpretations, each interpreter's choice must reflect his
view of which interpretation proposes the most value for the practice." Ibid. at 52. The
interpreter must construct a coherent and purposeful picture of the practice by choosing
between competing plausible understandings of it. He must "impose order" (ibid. at 273) -
coherency - on the apparently chaotic and contradictory raw materials of the practice by
making choices on which reasonable people might differ. Dworkin illustrates this with
reference to adjudication:
Hard cases arise, for any judge, when his threshold test does not discriminate
between two or more interpretations of some statute or line cases. Then he must
choose between eligible interpretations by asking which shows the community's
structure of institutions and decisions - its public standards as a whole - in a better
light from the standpoint of political morality. His own moral and political
convictions are now engaged.... Different judges will disagree about each of these
issues and will accordingly take different views of what the law of their community,
properly understood, really is.
238 Ibid.
239 B. Langille, supra, note 234.
240 0. Fiss, supra, note 234.
241 Interpretation is, according to Dworkin, "a matter of imposing purpose on an object
or practice in order to make of it the best possible example of the form or genre to which
it is taken to belong" Ibid. at 52. The analyst must understand the practice he is analyzing,
such as law, as serving a set of coherent purposes or principles. The rules and details of the
practice must then be "understood or applied or extended or modified or qualified or limited
in accordance with these purpose or principle." Ibid. at 47.
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transcend personal interest, and decide cases neutrally and
impartially.
The third point made in articulations of the weak constraint
argument is that, while legal materials may often allow for multiple
and competing plausible interpretations, the range is not infinite.
There may not be unique "right answers" to legal questions, but
wrong answers can be identified. The requirement that results must
be justified by existing legal doctrine ensures a limited range of
plausible interpretations. Thus, Langille adopts the view that
concepts like contract and property can no sooner be rejected by a
lawyer than can the second law of thermodynamics by a physicist.242
Similarly, Dworkin states that neither a Marxist nor a fascist
interpretation of the law could satisfy the requirement of doctrinal
justification.243 In short, the preclusion of radical interpretations is
assured.
The crux of the weak constraint thesis, then, is that while law
is not logically determinate, adjudication is nonetheless constrained
by the institutional and doctrinal structure in which it takes place.
Therefore, the argument goes, it is rational and constrained despite
the fact interpreters may differ a great deal in their understandings
of "indeterminate" legal prescriptions. Most perplexing about the
weak constraint thesis is its claim to legitimate the outcomes of
constitutional (and other forms of) adjudication. Logical determinacy
arguments, though implausible as descriptions of adjudication, at least
had an answer to the question of why judicial decisions should be
authoritative and obeyed. Legal outcomes were considered
legitimate because they supposedly represented the universal truths
of the constitution. Weak constraint arguments begin with a more
plausible account of the adjudicative process, by rejecting logical
determinacy as an adequate description, but have little to offer in
support of the legitimacy of the outcomes of that process. Their
answer to the problem of legitimacy appears to be that such
outcomes are legitimate because of the "impartiality" of the
adjudicative process, supposedly engendered by judges adopting an
"internal attitude" and thereby experiencing as binding the
242 B. Langille, supra, note 234 at 503-04.
243 R. Dworkin, supra, note 234 at 408.
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professional norms of the judiciary. This argument fails to account,
however, for the potential partiality - the "tilt" - of the shared
assumptions, values and methodologies that constitute the
"interpretive community" or "agreements in judgment" of the
judiciary. While these may be internalized and experienced as
constraining and authoritative by individual judges, that only ensures
judges will reproduce the partiality of the system they are a part of,
not that their decisions will be "impartial." The presence of an
internal attitude on the part of judges, while potentially allowing for
neutrality within the existing values and assumptions of the legal
system, tells us nothing about the extent to which those values and
assumptions genuinely reflect the interests and perspectives of groups
other than the judicial and legal elite.244 Adoption of the internal
attitude is tantamount to a commitment not to question the
assumptions of the system from outside the system. The questions
of why one should adopt an internal attitude or why the authority of
those who have adopted such attitudes is justified, however, remain
unanswered.
One of H.L.A. Hart's central insights was that the presence
of an internal attitude and the moral legitimacy of the legal system
in which it was held, were separate issues. For Hart, it was both
necessary and sufficient for a legal system to exist as a social fact
that: 1) the officials of that system internalized the system's rules of
recognition; and, 2) the subjects of the legal system were generally
obedient to the "primary rules" of the system. The important point
was that only the officials were required to have an internal attitude
toward the rules of the system. The "... rules of recognition
specifying the criteria of legal validity and its rules of change and
adjudication must be effectively accepted as common public standards
of official behaviour by its [the legal system's] officials."245  The
minimum requirement of the subjects of that system was obedience.
And, "they may obey 'each for [their] part only' and from any motive
244 P. Brest, supra, note 188. This idea is more fully developed in J. Bakan, "Partiality
and Legitimacy in Constitutional Theory," presented at the Legal Theory Workshop, Faculty
of Law, University of Toronto (8 November 1988). This document is on file at the Osgoode
Hall Law Journal.
245 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961) at 113.
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whatever. 246 While in a "healthy society," citizens would have an
internal attitude towards the rules of the system, a legal system could
exist in the absence of such an attitude. In other words, a legal
system could exist even if its subjects did not accept its rules as
"common standards of behaviour," and obeyed them only reluctantly
and out of fear of sanctions. A legal system could exist in Hart's
scheme even if almost the whole population was in a "state of
passive and coerced obedience."247
Hart accepted the weak constraint thesis as an accurate
description of the adjudicative process in a system where officials
adopted internal attitudes. He did not doubt that, in the absence of
determinate rules, judges did not simply "intrude their personal
preferences or blindly choose among alternatives."248  Quite the
contrary, in such cases they still operated within a "working body of
rules"249 which could be formulated in general terms as "principles,
policies and standards."250 And, within this context, there existed a
"phenomenology of considered decision: its felt involuntary or even
inevitable character."251 Indeed, for Hart, it was the "agreement in
judgement among lawyers" about the rules of the game that made
adjudication a "rational process."252  The crucial message behind
Hart's jurisprudence, however, was that from all of this did not a
justification make. Hart wanted to leave open the possibility that a
legal system could be judged morally, in spite of its internal
rationality, and the internal attitude towards its rules of recognition
by judicial officials. And he insisted it was necessary to preserve the
246 kid
247 N. MacCormick, H.L.A. Hart (London: Edward Arnold Ltd., 1981) at 22.
248 H.L.A. Hart, "Problems of Legal Reasoning" in J. Feinberg & H. Gross eds, Law in
Philosophical Perspective (Belmont, California: Watsworth Publishing Co., 1977) at 145.
249 Ibid.
250 Ibid.
251 Ibid. at 146.
252 Ibid.
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external perspective from which such judgements about the system's
moral worth could be made.
253
The difficulty with the weak constraint thesis is that questions
about the legitimacy of adjudicative outcomes are raised from the
internal perspective only. The legitimacy of the values and
assumptions constituting that perspective is taken for granted. Hart's
concern with preserving external perspectives is entirely absent.
Indeed, writers of the weak constraint school explicitly renounce and
marginalize critics who refuse to accept the legitimacy of the internal
perspective as a starting premise.254 Criticism should, in their view,
start from the premises of the system that is being criticized. The
implicit, and sometimes explicit, claim is that we should trust and
accept the values and assumptions judges have internalized. But this
brings us back to the difficulties encountered in Part III with the
argument that judges should be trusted. There it was argued that
because of the close alignment of the judicial perspective with the
interests and concerns of dominant groups in society, the judicial
perspective is presumptively partial. Therefore, there are no good
reasons for groups who do not share those interests and concerns to
trust decisions reflecting that perspective. The same critique applies
equally here. The "internal perspective" of the legal elite is an
insufficient basis for the legitimacy of judicial outcomes when it
reflects, as it does, the interests of society's dominant groups to the
exclusion of others.
VI.
We have seen that attempts by constitutional jurists to
establish formal grounds for the legitimacy of judicial review are
ultimately grounded in theories about constitutional truth or trust in
the judiciary. Those relying on constitutional truth argue amongst
themselves about the correct sources of truth. Some find it within
the four corners of the text, others in the alleged purposes of
253 Supra, note 245 at 206.
254 R. Dworkin, supra, note 234 at viii, 13, 14, 413; 0. Fiss, supra, note 234 at 748-50;
B. Langille, supra, note 234 at 499-504.
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particular constitutional provisions. The latter group are, in turn,
divided on the question of where to look to discover the purpose of
the provision: the intentions of the framers, traditional principles of
society, current normative consensus, the principles underlying
conventional constitutional law, or some combination of these. In
contrast to the seekers of constitutional truth, there are, as we have
seen, those who understand the search for truth as a futile exercise
and ground their claims that judicial review is legitimate in trust in
judges. They accept that judges are not constrained by constitutional
norms to reach "right answers" and invoke in defense of judicial
review the unique attributes of judges and the judicial office -
impartiality, moral acumen, and a sense of fairness and decency.
The first three Parts of my discussion attempted to demonstrate
the role played by arguments premissed on truth and trust
respectively in constitutional discourse before and after the
enactment of the Charter. In parts IV and V, I looked at two types
of argument related to the themes of truth and trust. First, there
was the restraint argument. According to it neither truth nor trust
are sufficient grounds for the legitimacy of judicial interference with
legislative decisions: there are no constitutional truths to constrain
judges, and there are no grounds upon which to trust them.
Therefore, the argument goes, the only legitimate judicial action in
constitutional cases is inaction. Secondly, in Part V, I discussed the
weak constraint theory as an attempt to meet the indeterminacy
critique developed in Part IL This theory accepts that the
constitution is indeterminate, but invokes in defense of judicial
review the principled and impartial style of decision making by
judges. As we saw, it ultimately relies on trust because it requires
unquestioning acceptance of the shared values and assumptions that
constitute the judicial perspective.
My aim throughout the paper was to demonstrate the
insufficiency of all of these arguments in accomplishing their purpose
of establishing formal grounds of legitimacy for judicial review. The
idea of constitutional truth is implausible. The questions that arise
in constitutional argument are controversial, and the materials relied
upon to answer them indeterminate. Interpreters of the constitution,
whether judges or anyone else, must make choices and exercise
discretion. And the idea of trusting judges to make such choices
and exercise discretion is problematic. Notwithstanding sincere
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attempts by judges to be impartial, principled and professional, they
cannot escape the personal and structural conditions that determine
a partial and elite perspective on the questions they must decide.
It is not clear why those who do not share that perspective should
trust and pay allegiance to decisions that manifest it. Restraint
arguments and the weak constraint thesis appear, superficially, to
provide ways out of the implausibility of constitutional truths and the
unacceptability of trust in judges. As I demonstrated above,
however, these arguments raise difficulties similar to those
encountered with the other arguments as well as new ones.
To conclude, the project of constructing formal grounds to
legitimate judicial review has been a failure. Pursuit of the
arguments advanced by constitutional jurists in Canada inevitably
leads one to premises that are either implausible or unacceptable
when situated in the actual practices and institutions constituting
judicial review. Such arguments may be sensible and coherent in the
absence of facts about the practice of judicial review, but that does
not provide them any weight in legitimating the results of that
practice. Accordingly, constitutional argument may best be
understood as a call to faith rather than persuasion by reason.
Martin Buber has said:
There are two, and in the end only two, types of faith. To be sure there are very
many contents of faith, but we only know faith itself in two basic forms. Both can
be understood from the simple data of our life: the one from the fact that I trust
someone, without being able to offer sufficient reasons for my trust in him; the
other from the fact that, likewise without being able to give a sufficient reason, I
acknowledge a thing to be true.
Within constitutional argument we see appeals to both truth and
trust, without sufficient reason for either. Constitutional arguments
do not even attempt to deal with the facts about the practice they
seek to legitimate. Quite the contrary, they proceed by obscuring
and marginalizing concerns - such as the indeterminacy of purposive
reasoning, or the partiality of judicial perspective - which should be
central to their analyses. Notwithstanding the pretensions of
intellectual rigour and analytical depth, constitutional arguments are
really just appeals for faith in the institution of judicial review and,
correspondingly, obedience to the outcomes of that institution. They
do not provide good reasons for the authority of judicial power.
255 M. Buber, Two Types of Faith (New York: Collier Books, 1951) at 7.
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